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[Sammendrag] In December 1991, Russia started down the road of its post-Soviet exist-
ence. The re-emergence of Russia as a separate, independent entity compelled the state to 
come to terms with its revived national identity. Russia’s relationship with the West lay at 
the core of the challenge to deﬁne what Russia is and how it should relate to the outside 
world. Opinion divided over whether Russia should rapidly integrate with Europe and 
“return to the civilized community of nations” or whether it should seek “a strengthening of 
Russia’s positions in the East” and rather pursue its unique mission as a mediator between 
the East and West.
Against this backdrop I have analysed Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe (CoE) 
and Russia’s partial compliance to the European Convention on the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Protocol No. 6, which refer to the abolishment 
of the death penalty in peacetime. 
Employing constructivist insights, I argue that this partial compliance is explained by the 
lack of a coherent and widely accepted national identity. Due to different perceptions of 
Russia’s identity among various state actors, identities collide, and interests, and conse-
quently action, will be in a competing and conﬂictual relationship to each other. Thus, norm 
compliance is challenged when identities overlap and their norms conﬂict. This, I argue, is 
evident in Russia’s relationship with the European ideational community and the country’s 
dealing with the death penalty issue. The more Russian state actors value the European 
identity of their state, the more they will seek to comply with “European” norms, such as the 
strong European abolitionist norm, and vice versa.
In my analysis, I also discuss whether it is right to completely dismiss rational explana-
tions to Russia’s partial compliance. In this way I bring my case into the midst of the 
rational–constructivist debate in International Relations theory. Contributing to this debate, I 
investigate whether an either-or approach is the most productive way of explaining Russia’s 
ideational behaviour or whether rational and constructivist assumptions combined may shed 
new light on how to understand Russian compliance with international human rights norms 
or the lack of such.
[Presentation] Trude Johnson is a political scientist from the University of Oslo. She has 
also a background in Russian studies, and has twice lived in Moscow for extended periods. 
While working on her MA thesis, she had a scholarship at the Centre for Russian Studies at 
the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.
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 1. Introduction 
 
In December 1991, with three-fourths of the former USSR’s territory and 
just over half of its population, Russia started down the road of its post-
Soviet existence. As a successor state to the Soviet Union, the Russian Fed-
eration was faced with multiple challenges. The re-emergence of Russia as a 
separate, independent entity compelled the Russian Federation to come to 
terms with its revived national identity and to redefine its national interests. 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union also changed the international environ-
ment. The bipolarity of the Cold War and the time of global superpowers 
came to an end. Emerging from the disintegration of a superpower, the Rus-
sian Federation was faced with the challenge to define its place in the new 
system of international relations.  
Russia’s relationship with the West lay at the core of its challenge to de-
fine what Russia is and how it should relate to the outside world. Opinion 
divided over whether Russia should rapidly integrate with Europe and “re-
turn to the civilized community of nations” or whether it should seek “a 
strengthening of Russia’s positions in the East” and rather pursue its unique 
mission as a mediator between the East and West (Richter in Wallander 
1996: 77, 81; Stankevich 1992: 48). Whereas the former approach saw Rus-
sian membership in European institutions as a way to ensure Russia’s new-
born democracy and respect for fundamental human rights, and eventually a 
full-fledged membership in the European community, the latter view op-
posed efforts to integrate Russia into Western institutions. Accordingly, Rus-
sia should rather protect its distinct traditions and culture from European 
domination and pursue to counterweight Western power by focusing its ef-
forts on neighbouring countries (Arbatov 1993; Crow 1993; Richter in Wal-
lander 1996).  
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian foreign policy and domestic 
opinion has vacillated between pro-western sentiments on the one hand and 
statist and nationalist sentiments on the other. Upon achieving independence 
pro-western sentiments dominated the Russian scene. Foreign Minister An-
drei Kozyrev emphasised the importance of universal human rights as a way 
to integrate Russia into the family of democratic states and to revive Russia 
as a normal great power. With the support of President Boris Yeltsin and 
Yeltsin’s close associates in the presidential administration and cabinet of 
ministers, Russia’s first aim was to establish close ties with Western states 
and organisations (Arbatov 1993: 9; Oldberg et al. 1999: 9). Russian mem-
bership in EU, NATO and WTO among others was discussed, and in 1992 
Russia applied to join the Council of Europe (CoE). However, the pro-
Western orientation within Russia’s governing elite was not universally 
shared throughout Russian society. The electoral victories by neo-nationalist 
Vladimir Zhirinovskii in 1993 and the CPRF in 1995 led democratic reform-
ers on the defensive whereas anti-Western sentiments surfaced and found a 
stronghold in the State Duma (Donaldson & Nogee 1998; Tuminez in Wal-
lander 1996). The pro-Western orientation came to a final end when Yeltsin 
in January 1996 dismissed Kozyrev and appointed Yevgenii Primakov as his 
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successor, a person known for his anti-Western and pro-Eastern stances 
(McFaul 1997/98: 26; Oldberg et al. 1999: 15; Richter in Wallander 1996). 
President Vladimir Putin on the other hand has seized every opportunity 
to emphasize that Russia considers itself to be an indisputable part of 
Europe, seeking to enhance its participation in integrationist processes on the 
continent (Lo 2003: 102). However, as one has put it, “unlike during the 
early years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency – on Russia’s terms” (Legvold 
2001: 65). As opposed to Yeltsin, Putin enjoys full support in the State 
Duma after the Duma election in 2003. At the same time, however, statist 
sentiments is the dominant thought in Russian foreign policy discourse 
(Morozov 2002). Thus, Russia’s ambivalent relationship with the West is 
apparent during Putin’s presidency as well. 
It is against this backdrop that I will analyse Russia’s membership in the 
Council of Europe and its compliance to the European Convention on the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Protocol 
No. 6. Russia has abolished the death penalty de facto, but not de jure. Thus, 
so far Russia has not managed to fully meet the commitments undertaken 
when becoming a member of the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, by having 
outlawed the death penalty in practice Russia has taken a fundamental step 
forward to meet the Council’s requirements.  
Employing constructivist insights, I argue that Russia’s partial compli-
ance to Protocol No. 6 is explained by the lack of a coherent and widely ac-
cepted national identity, which is part of a wider, more fundamental identity 
debate that has lasted for centuries in Russia. To Russian Westernizers a 
CoE membership would incorporate Russia into Europe’s most developed 
normative structure, thereby certifying Russia’s path to democracy and pro-
tection of human rights. Moreover, this would confirm Russia as a European 
state built on the same norms and values. Anti-Western sentiments on the 
other hand have opposed a European orientation and any integration into 
Western institutions. These opposing views, I argue, have led to a vacillating 
adherence to European human rights standards and a Russian fluctuation in 
foreign policy.  
In my analysis chapter I will bring in alternative explanations to Russia’s 
partial compliance with Protocol No. 6. Given my constructivist orientation, 
the logical alternative explanations to norm compliance are more rational 
explanations. In this way I bring my case into the midst of the rational–
constructivist debate in International Relations (IR) theory. Contributing to 
this debate I investigate whether an either-or approach is the most productive 
way of explaining Russia’s ideational behaviour or whether rational and 
constructivist assumptions combined may shed new light on how to under-
stand Russian compliance with international human rights norms or the lack 
of such. 
1.1. A Constructivist Approach to Russia’s Partial Compliance 
 
I turn to constructivism for three reasons. First, Russia’s compliance to in-
ternational human rights standards is a question of norms and norm-
compliance. The constructivist project has helped to bring about a revival of 
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interests in norms and ideas by highlighting the independent role of norms 
and ideas in affecting international and domestic policy outcomes. “What 
makes the world hang together” is the belief that the environment in which 
states operates is as much ideational and social as it is material (Hansen 
2002b). Norms may not merely constrain the behaviour of states, but by car-
rying social content they provide states with understanding of interests and 
may change behaviour independent of underlying power distribution 
(Checkel 1999). Empirical studies have documented the impact of norms on 
patterns of international outcomes, and developed mechanisms to investigate 
how norms work. By drawing on this scholarly research I will examine how 
the Council of Europe’s robust abolitionist norm has coincided with Russian 
domestic norms, and how this has had an impact on Russia’s compliance.  
Second, whereas the more dominant paradigms of neorealism and neolib-
eral institutionalism within the field of IR treat the identity and interests of 
actors as exogenous and given, constructivism believe that the interests and 
identities of states are created – at least in part – through interaction and can 
change through interaction. Constructivism assumes that the selves, or iden-
tities, of states are a variable; they depend on historical, cultural, political, 
and social context (Hopf 1998). What follows is that interests are the product 
of identity (ibid.; Wendt 1994). By using these insights, I will look into how 
the Russian “dual identity” and the century old discussion between Slavo-
philes and Westernizers may have led to divergent interests and subse-
quently resulted in contradictory action and behaviour when dealing with 
ECHR Protocol No. 6. 
Third, the constructivist approach challenges the rational paradigm that 
treats states as rational and unitary actors. Constructivists argue that in order 
to understand states’ behaviour in international relations it is necessary to 
look into “the black box”. Whereas Yeltsin’s pro-Western orientation turned 
out to meet strong opposition in the State Duma, Putin has enjoyed strong 
support in his choices. The constructivist approach allows us to investigate 
what is taking place on the domestic arena; how policy preferences and un-
derlying identities of domestic actors may be channelled through different 
political institutions and consequently what kind of behaviour that results in. 
In the thesis I will therefore look into how especially the executive and the 
legislative branches of power have dealt with the death penalty issue, and 
subsequently map out how that has influenced Russia’s partial compliance. 
1.2. Methodological Considerations 
 
Various research situations correspond with different research strategies, and 
each strategy is a different way of collecting and analysing empirical evi-
dence. When choosing research strategy, one needs to take into considera-
tion the type of research question, the extent of control an investigator has 
over actual behavioural events, as well as the degree of focus on contempo-
rary as opposed to historical events (Yin 1994: 4). According to Yin, a case 
study is an empirical inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phe-
nomenon and context are not clearly evident” (ibid.: 13). Put differently, a 
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case study strategy has a distinct advantage when one seeks to explore the 
“why” or “how” in a contemporary set of events in which the investigator 
has little or no control (ibid.: 9). Eckstein brackets down the definition of a 
case to be defined technically “as a phenomenon for which we report and 
interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable” (Eckstein 1975: 
85). 
In general, case studies can serve five main purposes: testing theories, 
creating theories, identifying antecedent conditions, testing the importance 
of these antecedent conditions, and explaining cases of particular impor-
tance.1 In my case study I pursue the first purpose; namely to test the ex-
planatory power of constructivism in Russia’s partial compliance, followed 
by an investigation of how alternative explanations may shed light on Rus-
sia’s behaviour. Van Evera points to three formats for testing theories used 
in case studies: controlled comparison, congruence procedures, and process 
tracing (van Evera 1997). In this study the latter design will be pursued. The 
process-tracing format allows the investigator to explore the chain of events 
or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are trans-
formed into case outcomes (ibid.: 64). As van Evera explains: “the cause–
effect link than connects independent variable and outcome is unwrapped 
and divided into smaller steps; then the investigator looks for observable 
evidence of each step” (ibid.). Consequently, no other theories predict the 
same pattern of events and therefore a careful process-trace of one single 
case can provide a strong test of a theory.  
During recent years much scholarly literature on case-study methodology 
has appeared, but no complete catalogue of research design for case studies 
has emerged (Yin 1994: 18–19). However, the “why’s” and “how’s” are part 
of a case study’s research design as is the study’s propositions, its units of 
analysis, the logic link from the data to the propositions, and the criteria for 
interpreting the findings (ibid.: 20). Why has Russia partially complied with 
ECHR Protocol No. 6? What might explain Russia’s de facto moratorium on 
the death penalty, and in general how has Russia dealt with the death penalty 
issue? These questions imply my study questions and my study propositions. 
The third component of a research design is the unit of analysis, which is 
related to the fundamental challenge of defining what a case is. The unit of 
analysis for my case study is Russia’s compliance or non-compliance with 
international human rights norms, more specifically ECHR Protocol No. 6. 
Moreover, following Yin’s fourth criteria, I use process-tracing as a way to 
link data and propositions. I attempt to interpret my findings by using con-
structivist insights, but by bringing in alternative explanations the findings 
are put in a comparative perspective through two rival propositions.  
When addressing the designing of case studies a primary distinction is 
drawn between single- and multiple-case designs. When investigating Rus-
sia’s partial compliance to Protocol No. 6, the study corresponds to a single-
case design. The choice to follow a single-case research strategy is justified 
when the case represents a critical test of existing theory, where the case is a 
                                                     
1  Naturally, these functions overlap and they are often used simultaneously. For instance 
one can explain cases, create theories and test theories in one study, as well as identify 
and test antecedent conditions in another. For further elaboration, see van Evera (1997: 
55). 
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rare or unique event, or where the case serves a revelatory purpose (Yin 
1994: 44). Van Evera (1997) lists several case-selection criteria. However, 
one should select a case that best serves one of the five purposes for case 
studies. This of course, requires that the investigator is clear about his or her 
purpose before selecting a case.  
By choosing Russia as a case my hope is that I will be able to discover 
valuable empirical findings as well as contribute to the general theoretical 
debate within the field of International Relations. By applying constructivist 
insights, I use Russia’s partial compliance as a critical case in testing a well-
formulated theory. In turn, I use the single case to determine whether the 
theory’s propositions are correct or whether rationalism and instrumental 
calculation as alternative explanations may add valuable insights to the ex-
planation. Following van Evera’s case selection criterions, I then select a 
case which competing theories make opposite predictions about and which 
resemble current situations of policy concern. Moreover, I argue that Rus-
sia’s partial compliance may serve as a case of intrinsic importance and as an 
outlier case. 
By studying reports on the human rights situation in Russia by various 
NGOs and IGOs one may easily find examples of how Russia is violating 
some of the most basic human rights, the Chechen case of course being the 
prime example. At the same time, as a Contracting Party to the ECHR, Rus-
sia has taken important steps in improving the protection of human rights in 
the country. By choosing a case of partial compliance I wish to capture this 
vacillating approach towards human rights in one particular right firmly em-
bedded in the European human rights regime through ECHR Protocol No. 6. 
My hope is that this will reveal some of the features that characterize Rus-
sia’s discrepancy in regards to compliance with European norms and stan-
dards, both the ones that encourage compliance and the ones discouraging it, 
and not only one or the other. 
Of course, Russia’s partial compliance inclines that this is neither a clear-
cut case where “the dog didn’t bark”, nor a case where Russia is completely 
deviating from “happy liberal norms”.2 Nevertheless, I believe that the case 
will contribute to the scholarly field in several ways. First of all, as Russia is 
a great power, the Russian case may uncover features that are decisive for 
norm-compliance among powerful states. Secondly, by focusing on the 
president and his administration and the Russian parliament, the role of deci-
sion-makers in norm compliance is in focus. Thirdly, by looking into how 
domestic norms correspond with international norms one may obtain an un-
derstanding of how this may influence the state’s adherence to an interna-
tional norm. Finally, there is the question of identity; in line with my theo-
retical argument, a state’s interest to comply with an international norm will 
depend on the domestic salience of the identity specified by the norm. 
 
                                                     
2  Sarah Mendelson notes, “in many ways, Russia looks like another case of diffusion of 
‘happy’ liberal norms”, but when taking a closer look at the country, she continues, “Rus-
sia dramatically contrasts with the ‘success stories’ of norm diffusion” (Mendelson 2002: 
45). In his study Checkel calls for greater consideration of cases where the “dog didn’t 
bark” (Checkel 1999: 86).  
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1.2.1. Data Collection 
 
According to Yin (1994), there are three principles of data collection that 
will significantly increase the reliability of the case study if incorporated into 
the investigation. The first is the use of multiple sources of evidence con-
verging on the same set of facts. The second principle is the importance of 
establishing a case study database, emphasizing the significance of maintain-
ing a chain of evidence in which there are explicit links between the ques-
tions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn. The third princi-
ple refers to the reliability of the information in a case study, which allows 
for others to trace any evidence in the case study conclusions back to the 
initial research (or the other way round).  
To uphold the first principle, I base my empirical material on data col-
lected in multiple ways. The case study evidence has been built on three 
common primary sources: documentation, archival records, and a handful of 
interviews. The documentation sources are essential in the dissertation and 
consist of letters, speeches, administrative documents (progress reports, reso-
lutions, recommendations, reports of events), and newspaper articles. Yin 
has clarified the importance of reading documents with care and a critical 
sense to avoid over-reliance on documents, and understanding that the 
documentary evidence is a communication between parties attempting to 
achieve some other objectives (Yin 1994: 82). When interpreting the content 
of such evidence, I have throughout the thesis tried to my best capacity to 
bear this in mind.  
To some extent archival records have been used in the study, mostly what 
I have obtained from a visit to Strasbourg. The time and effort spent on in-
terviews have been substantial, even though I did not manage to carry out as 
many interviews as I had hoped. This was mainly due to the lack of re-
sources in Strasbourg and of access to the “right people” in Russia. Never-
theless, visits to Moscow and to the Council’s headquarters in Strasbourg 
proved to be very valuable. The rationale behind the two visits is evident; in 
order to obtain an impression of the Russian domestic debate, it was essen-
tial to speak with persons who could provide new important insights into the 
situation and who simply corroborated already established facts. An inter-
view with an independent Duma member who has been very active in the 
death penalty debate in Russia certainly contributed to this. Even though the 
same motivation was relevant for doing interviews in Strasbourg, the objec-
tive was slightly different. To maintain the two-level perspective, I saw it as 
crucial to understand the Council’s perception of the topic. In addition to 
interviewing people in the Council, I managed to gather valuable documen-
tary sources. Furthermore, the thesis draws on secondary sources obtained 
from research carried out by scholars in both the legal field and the IR-field.  
By utilizing various primary and secondary sources, I have endeavoured 
to develop converging lines of inquiry. Yin also refers to this as a process of 
data triangulation, which in turn addresses the validity in a research project 
(Yin 1994: 92–93). Any findings are likely to be much more convincing and 
accurate when they are based on several different sources of information. 
Moreover, in this way, what I say should correlate to what I observe, identify 
and measure (Bryman 2001). By using process-tracing, I attempt to obtain a 
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strong degree of internal validity by for instance showing how Russia’s dual 
identity and the lack of domestic salience for the international abolitionist 
norm lead to a vacillating adherence to European human rights norms. 
 
 2. Constructivism and Human Rights: An Ideational Turn in IR 
 
As recently as the early 1970s, most policy-makers believed that the promo-
tion of human rights was a moral concern not appropriate for international 
politics (Schmitz & Sikkink 2002: 517). However, today due to an ideational 
turn in international politics human rights are conceived as being an integral 
part of foreign policy and international relations. With the establishment of 
the United Nations, human rights emerged as a standard subject of interna-
tional relations (Donnelly 1993: 7). Certainly, normative and ideational con-
cerns have always informed the study of international politics. Attempts in 
the 1960s and 1970s to build a science of politics modelled on economics or 
natural science, however, displaced these concerns (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998). It was the regimes scholarship of the early 1980s that opened the door 
for a re-emphasise of ideational and social phenomena (ibid.). 
In this chapter I have two main tasks. First, I lay out my theoretical ar-
gument. I argue that interests and consequent behaviour is the product of 
identity, and in turn I claim that norms are ultimately linked to behaviour 
and identity. In my outline I show how I arrive at my theoretical argument 
by building on constructivist research that has focused on norms, identity 
and domestic politics. Next, I take my theoretical argument and implement it 
on empirical material. The dissolution of the Soviet Union reinvoked an old 
question of the Russian identity; was it European or something else? I argue 
that due to the lack of a coherent and unified identity among state actors in 
post-Soviet Russia, these actors have conflicting interests as to whether they 
should comply with European norms or not. Consequently, this leads to a 
vacillating adherence to European human rights norms, which may be seen 
in Russia’s partial compliance with ECHR Protocol No. 6.  
2.1. The Concept of Norms 
 
Naturally, all research on norms revolves around the concept of “norm”. 
When studying norms “as causes” for behaviour the analytical focus is on 
ways of behaviour in relation to types of norms, such as human rights and 
environmental standards (Wiener 2004: 198; Checkel 2001). Finnemore and 
Sikkink understand a norm as shared expectations about appropriate behav-
iour held by a collectivity of actors (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). Wiener 
distinguishes between two categories of norms (Wiener 2004: 199). On the 
one hand is a generic category of social norms that provides “reason” which 
appear persuasive to decision-makers, and on the other hand a specific cate-
gory of procedural norms, which entail “instructions” that are applicable un-
der given circumstances (ibid.). According to Wiener, the first category en-
compasses worldviews or core constitutional norms and principles, and are 
therefore also termed as normative structure or frame. The latter category on 
the other hand is understood as “behavioural rules” such as specified regula-
tions and prescriptions (ibid.). Herrmann and Shannon (2001) focus on pre-
scriptive norms. They state that norms affect conceptions of identities and 
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interests in the process of actor decision-making and that “prescriptive 
norms give rise to feelings of moral obligation to abide by and defend the 
norm” (ibid.: 623). Furthermore, they note that prescriptive norms are inevi-
tably connected to behaviour or action (ibid.: 625). Action may be affected 
by several considerations relating to both moral concerns springing from 
established descriptive norms and material desires for wealth and strategic 
advantage. 
2.1.1. The Emergence and Operation of Norms 
 
Much of constructivist research on norms has begun at the broadest level of 
analysis by emphasizing the international normative context. According to 
this perspective, the impact human rights can have depends on the strength 
of international norms. Lutz and Sikkink argue that in order to understand 
the improvement in human rights practices one needs to consider how a re-
gional norm shift may lead to an increased regional and international con-
sensus (Lutz & Sikkink 2000). They refer to a norm cascade – a rapid shift 
toward new international human rights norms – and its impact on greater 
compliance with international human rights norms. Furthermore, they sug-
gest that norm cascades are collections of norm-affirming events, such as 
formal articulations of norms in declarations or treaties, statements in 
speeches of governmental officials, or the incorporation of the international 
norm into domestic legislation. Thus, norm-affirming events are discursive 
events; verbal or written statements asserting the norm. 
In an earlier work, Finnemore and Sikkink illustrate how norm influence 
may be understood as a three-stage process (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). 
They refer to a norm’s “life cycle” involving norm emergence, norm “cas-
cade” and norm internalisation. So-called norm entrepreneurs with organiza-
tional platforms who through the “logic of appropriateness” persuade a 
“critical mass of states” characterize the first stage.3 Finnemore shows in her 
research how agents having strong notions about appropriate behaviour build 
norms (Finnemore 1996). Furthermore, for an emergent norm to reach a 
threshold and move toward the second stage, it must become institutional-
ised in specific sets of international rules and organizations. With the support 
of “a critical mass of states” which endorse the norm and the expertise of 
international organizations, the norm reaches a tipping point followed by a 
process of socialization that describes stage two. At the far end of the norm 
cascade, in the third stage norms are internalised and taken for granted.  
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) point to notions of “world time” as an-
other way of norm emergence. According to the argument, ideas and norms 
associated with the losing side of a war are particularly at the risk of being 
discredited, opening the door for new alternatives. Furthermore, the current 
period of globalisation may be seen as one that promotes dramatic expansion 
of new norms. Since the Second World War, the number of international 
organizations has exploded and more opportunities to address and negotiate 
                                                     
3  The authors propose two hypotheses about what constitutes a critical mass and when and 
where to expect norm tipping. First, at leas one-third of the total states in the system must 
adopt the norm. Second, it matters which states adopt the norm. One criterion of critical 
states is that they are those without which the achievement of the substantive norm is 
compromised. States may also be critical because they have a certain moral stature. 
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on a broad range of normative issues is contributing to an acceleration of this 
process. Risse and Sikkink emphasize how changes in “world time” may 
account for the growing visibility of human rights norms (Risse et al. 1999). 
Thus, the influence of international human rights approaches is greater now 
than during earlier historical periods (ibid.: 19–22). The arguments put forth 
by Florini are similar to the notion of “world time” when she stresses the 
importance of norm “prominence” and legitimacy in the international envi-
ronment (Florini 1996). A norm is reproduced either vertically or horizon-
tally, where the former is simply a continuation of a norm through genera-
tions of leaders within a single state. The latter, however, refers to emulation 
and is the mechanism by which norms change across state boundaries. This, 
she argues, may happen in large-scale turnover of decision-makers, as in 
wars or revolutions (ibid.). 
2.2. States’ Interests and Actions: a Product of Identity 
 
The constructivist project has challenged the conventional IR theories on 
some of its most fundamental assumptions. Whereas rational approaches 
sees the identity and interests of actors as exogenous, constructivism treats 
identity as an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context 
and as variables endogenous to interaction (Wendt 1994). Identity is some-
thing possessed by individual persons in “a deep psychological sense (i.e. 
male and female identity, class, race) or can involve self-ascription as be-
longing to a group with others who similarly identify and are committed to 
similar values, practices and meanings” (Young 1997: 33). Individuals can 
possess multiple identities that have both personal and collective dimensions 
(Castells 1997). States’ identities “emerge from their interactions with dif-
ferent social environments, both domestic and international” (Katzenstein 
1996: 24). Wendt stresses, that “actors acquire identities – relative stable, 
role-specific understandings and expectations about self – by participating in 
(…) collective meaning” (Wendt 1992: 397). 
Moreover, identities are inherently relational, and “identity, with its ap-
propriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a 
specific, socially constructed world” (Berger in Wendt 1992: 398). Thomas 
states that international relations involve repeated encounters with others 
“that provoke reflection on what shared practices makes us ‘us’, what char-
acteristics ‘we’ share (or not share) with ‘them’, and what we need to do to 
be true to ourselves or to gain the approval of others ‘like us’” (Thomas 
2001: 13). In this way identity becomes definitions of self in relation to oth-
ers that give guidance for how one should act in a given context. According 
to Hopf (1998), “in telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a par-
ticular set of interests with respect to choices of action in particular domains, 
and with respect to particular actors”.  
A central argument in the constructivist approach is that states might 
form collective identities and interests through interaction; the intersubjec-
tive structure is the arbiter of meaning (Hopf 1998: 175). Through social 
practice, actors and structures mutually constitute each other and identities 
and interests as well as communities are produced and reproduced (ibid.; 
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Wendt 1994). With repeated reciprocal cooperation, actors form mutual ex-
pectations that enable them to continue to cooperate. As Wendt notes, 
through repeated acts of cooperation “an actor will gradually change its own 
beliefs about who it is”, and he continues, “actors are simultaneously learn-
ing to identify with each other – to see themselves as a ‘we’ bound by certain 
norms” (Wendt 1994: 390). By causing certain expectations with regard to 
behaviour, the collective identity enables members of the “in-group” to share 
positive understandings of each other (Hansen 2002b). Consequently, as be-
haviour changes to meet the prescribed norms, the collective identity forma-
tion makes possible the transition from “them” to “us”. This development 
may be fuelled by cooperation between states and by international organiza-
tions that serve as forums for collective identity formation. 
The constructivist approach and its emphasis on collective identity for-
mation have been criticized for neglecting domestic politics. Wendt only 
briefly pays attention to the domestic level as he writes, “in view of my con-
cern with endogenizing identity change to systemic level, I shall limit my 
focus to factors at the systemic level, even though domestic factors may mat-
ter, as well” (Wendt 1994: 388). Commenting on the works of Wendt, 
Ringmar states “how the problem of identity formation is constantly seen 
from the perspective of the system and never as a problem each state and 
each statesman has to grapple with” (Ringmar in Hansen 2002b: 403) and 
adds that “[structure] cannot by itself explain changes in identities” (ibid.). 
As Checkel notes, it is necessary to relax the unitary-actor assumption, and 
in this way restore the role of agency “in its rightful place in constructivism” 
(Checkel 1999). By doing so, one can provide explanations for important 
cross-national variation in compliance with international norms, and how 
and why norms diffuse into the domestic arena (Risse et al. 1999). Hence, in 
the next section I will investigate how research has endeavoured to bring 
analysis of domestic politics into the study of norms and norm-compliance. 
2.3. The Reinforcement of Domestic Politics 
 
When addressing the issue of domestic politics, a natural point of departure 
is to elucidate how scholars define domestic politics. Milner seems to under-
line institutions as the way to recognize domestic politics (Milner 1998). She 
highlights that the rational institutionalist view can show how diverse do-
mestic preferences are aggregated into collective choices, given different 
political institutions (ibid.: 761). This key characterization of domestic poli-
tics highlights domestic interests and institutions, and thus (reconnects) IR to 
other fields in political science. Correspondingly, although in a slightly dif-
ferent way, Martin and Simmons (1998) emphasize the role of institutions in 
IR. They argue that to understand the relation between domestic and interna-
tional institutions the central question is where domestic actors intentionally 
delegate policy-making authority to the international level when this furthers 
their pursuit of interests in areas like territorial disputes and trade policy 
(Martin & Simmons 1998). Belonging to the constructivist school Ted Hopf 
presents a very different perception of domestic politics (Hopf 2002). His 
research is centred on the conception of identities and how this subsequently 
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has an impact on a country’s foreign policy. His study seems to proclaim 
that identities are domestic politics.  
2.3.1. International Norms and State Performance 
 
Substantial constructivist literature on domestic politics highlights norms 
and norm-compliance. Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s work from 1999 demon-
strate how civil society and social movements influence state compliance to 
international norms (Risse et al. 1999). Other studies draw attention to the 
domestic configuration of ideas and identity. Within this field, Checkel’s 
studies investigate the adoption and diffusion of norms. He investigates the 
degree to which norms promoted by the Council of Europe affect the discus-
sion over citizenship and national minorities in contemporary Germany 
(Checkel 1999). The argument put forth demonstrates how domestic struc-
ture may predict the diffusion pathways international norms take, either 
through societal pressure or elite learning. The emphasis on domestic struc-
tures when explaining an international norm’s domestic impact is in accor-
dance with Koh’s argument. “Legal internalization”, Koh claims, “occurs 
when an international norm is incorporated into the domestic legal system 
through executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative action, or some 
combination of the three” (Koh 1997: 2657).  
Research undertaken by Cortell and Davis stresses the need to focus on a 
norm’s domestic salience as well as its international legitimacy if one is to 
achieve further progress on a domestic approach to norm-compliance (Cor-
tell & Davis 2000). Greater attention must be given to the measurement of a 
norm’s strength, legitimacy, or salience in the domestic political arena and 
the mechanisms and processes by which international norms may or may not 
achieve domestic legitimacy (ibid.: 68). The authors point to three indicators 
that imply what level of domestic salience the international norm has 
achieved: the norm’s appearance in the domestic political discourse is the 
first sign of domestic impact, changes in national institutions provides a sec-
ond indicator, and the third indicator involves analysis of the state’s policies.  
To understand how international norms are introduced and embedded 
into a nation’s domestic level, Cortell and Davis identify five key factors. 
The first factor is the “cultural match”, which implies that pre-existing do-
mestic understandings condition the impact of international norms in policy 
debates (Cortell & Davis 2000: 73). The four other key factors Cortell and 
Davis describe are the pathways through which an international norm can 
enter the domestic arena (namely through national political rhetoric), mate-
rial interests of domestic actors, domestic political institutions, and socializ-
ing forces (ibid.: 2000).4 Scholars working in this tradition expect interna-
tional pressure to be most influential when a “cultural match” exists between 
the international and domestic norm. By measuring the degree of fit between 
the international and domestic norm one may determine the pattern and de-
                                                     
4  National rhetoric or persuasive discourse is a mechanism for generating collective under-
standings and the domestic salience of an international norm. See Kratochwill (1989). If 
the international norm supports important domestic material interests, then it is more 
likely that it will become salient. Domestic institutions contribute to the salience of an in-
ternational norm. 
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gree of diffusion and make predictions of the norm’s empowerment 
(Checkel 1999). 
2.4. Human Rights in IR: from Written Statements to Actual Behaviour 
 
The outline above demonstrates the “added value” of constructivism to the 
study of international relations. Its contribution to international relations 
studies has led scholars within the field to conclude that the debate between 
rationalists and constructivists either currently is, or is about to become, the 
most significant one in the discipline (Zehfuss 2002: 2). One of the central 
assumptions is the belief that the environment in which states operates is as 
much social as it is material. The rational paradigm, it is argued, is not 
equipped to capture the important social forces interacting with and giving 
meaning to material factors (Hansen 2002b). By focusing on norms, identity 
and interests the constructivist paradigm attempts to explain how this may 
shape the material world and explain forces of change (ibid.).  
As the review above shows, scholars within the constructivist school 
have in various ways focused on norms, identity, interests, behaviour and – 
recently – domestic politics. What is essential in this thesis is the interplay 
between these concepts. I will build on the constructivist argument that 
norms are ultimately linked to behaviour and identity, as “a norm is a stan-
dard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore & 
Sikkink 1998). The normative framework that norms create serves as the 
background against which any action has to be viewed (Hansen 2002b). To 
quote Hopf: “given that interests are the product of identity (…) and that 
identities are multiple, constructivist logic precludes acceptance of pregiven 
interests” (Hopf 1998: 175).5 Identities give each state an understanding of 
other states, its interests, probable actions, attitudes, and role in any given 
political context (ibid.: 193). Jepperson, Katzenstein and Wendt point out 
that states may develop interests linked to particular identities, or domestic 
identity politics may be reflected in foreign policy interests (Katzenstein 
1996). Wendt further highlights the role between identity and interest: 
 
I argue that interests are dependent on identities and so are not competing causal 
mechanisms but distinct phenomenon – in the one case, motivational, in the 
other, cognitive and structural – and, as such play different roles in explaining 
action (Wendt 1994: 385). 
 
What follows is that identity becomes the link between norms and interests 
that motivate behaviour, and whether it is in the state’s interest to comply or 
violate a norm depends on how it defines the self in relation to others. In turn 
the adherence to a community norm may redraw the boundaries between 
“us” and “them”, therefore when behaviours change to meet the prescribed 
norms, the collective identity formation makes possible the transition from 
“them” to “us” (Hansen 2002b: 402). Fig. 1 draws up the relationship be-
tween norm, identity, interests and behaviour outlined above. 
 
                                                     
5  I use the term interests and preferences interchangeably. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between norm, identity, interests and behaviour 
 
 
 
Moreover, the reinforcement of domestic politics enables us to better com-
prehend a state’s response and performance to international norms. Con-
structivism provides an approach for uncovering features of domestic society 
and culture that should matter to state identity and state action in global poli-
tics. Hopf highlights a key point: 
 
Any state identity in world politics is partly the product of the social practices 
that constitute that identity at home. In this way, identity politics at home con-
strain and enable state identity, interests, and actions abroad (…) within the state 
itself might exist areas of cultural practice, sufficiently empowered through insti-
tutionalisation and authorization, to exert a constitutive or causative influence on 
state policy (Hopf 1998: 194–95). 
 
Thus, by incorporating domestic politics into the equation one must also pay 
attention to the norm’s domestic legitimacy, as well as its international sali-
ence. I will argue that state compliance to an international norm depends 
upon whether the norm is seen as legitimate at the domestic level, but also 
that a state actor’s sense of duty to comply with that norm will vary with the 
salience of the identity specified by the norm (Thomas 2001: 15). A state has 
multiple identities, and when these identities collide interests and conse-
quently action will be in a competing and conflictual relationship to each 
other. Thus, norm compliance is challenged when identities overlap and their 
norms conflict. As an example, one may point to the value a state put on a 
European identity. The more state actors value the European identity of their 
state, the more they will seek to comply with norms incumbent upon Euro-
pean states (ibid.). It follows that in the opposite case actors will be more 
reluctant to abide by European norms, and norm violation is more likely. 
2.5. CoE and Russia’s Partial Compliance to ECHR Protocol    No. 6 
 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union catalysed a transition that questioned the 
norms and values of the Soviet society and its view of history and the politi-
cal world (Suny in Brown 2001). The fall of communism and the Soviet Un-
ion may perhaps be characterized as a notion of “world time” (cf. Finnemore 
& Sikkink 1998), which opened up the door for new ideas and norms. More-
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over, Russia’s post-Soviet “identity crisis” reinvoked an old question: Is 
Russia part of Europe or is it an Asian or Eurasian power? Whereas reform-
minded politicians and commentators argued that Russia was undoubtedly a 
European state, those more nationalistically minded claimed a unique Eura-
sian role for Russia. At the same time the weakening of the Soviet value sys-
tem confronted the majority of people with a system they were completely 
unfamiliar with (Suny in Brown 2001). Consequently, Russia became deeply 
divided between those who supported the general direction of change initi-
ated by Gorbachev and Yeltsin and those who disapproved of the westward 
orientation of the state. Research has demonstrated how state actor’s percep-
tions of Russian identity subsequently define the country’s interests. Herman 
states, “in the case of the sweeping redefinition of interests that yielded the 
radical variant of New Thinking, constitutive norms of identity were the 
principal motor force” (Herman in Katzenstein 1996: 283). In addition to 
explaining the shift in Soviet foreign and military policy, others demonstrate 
how Russia’s relationship to the EU and endorsement of the European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy (ESDP) may be viewed in a context of shared norms 
and identities (Hansen 2002a & b).  
My thesis will draw on this literature, and argue that Russia’s wish to join 
the CoE is explained by an aspiration to “return to Europe”. The identity of 
the CoE rests on two pillars: democracy and human rights. Since the CoE 
more than any other European organization has been built on these two pil-
lars, Russia would by becoming a member finally recognize its identity as 
belonging to the European ideational community. Having developed one of 
the most advanced systems for protection of human rights anywhere in the 
world, the CoE would make out a normative structure – or in Wiener’s 
terms, frame. The rights are laid down in the ECHR and its Protocols.  
The CoE has lead the way in the European movement towards the abol-
ishment of death penalty, and in 1994 the abolition of the punishment was 
made a precondition for membership in the organization. By 2005, all CoE 
members, except Russia, has ratified the protocol and abolished the death 
penalty de jure. Hence, there is a strong European consensus on the abol-
ishment of capital punishment; “a critical mass of states” has endorsed the 
norm. Recapturing Finnemore and Sikkink’s understanding of a norm; there 
is therefore a shared expectation in the CoE that to abolish the death penalty 
is the appropriate way to behave as a member. Moreover, the abolitionist 
norm would be classified as a prescriptive norm, which as stated above is 
inevitably connected to behaviour (Herrmann & Shannon 2001). 
With a Russian identity embedded in the European normative structure, 
Russia should have an interest in complying with CoE standards and take 
action to fully abolish the death penalty. However, Russia has only partially 
complied. Why? I will argue that in order to explain this, one also needs to 
bring in the domestic politics argument. By relaxing the unitary-actor as-
sumption, one will be able to disclose how policy-making in Russia is char-
acterized by ongoing battles among actors that adhere to a European identity 
and actors that oppose this orientation. These actors have conflicting inter-
ests as to whether they should comply with European norms or not. Through 
social practice with the CoE actors with a pro-western orientation would 
want to behave in accordance with what is seen as appropriate behaviour in 
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the European community, whereas other actors are more reluctant to abide 
by European norms.  
By opening up of the “black box”, one may investigate how these differ-
ent sources of influence play an important role in defining how Russia acts. 
Additionally it opens up for a study of how policy preferences and underly-
ing identities of domestic actors may be channelled through different politi-
cal institutions. Earlier research has established that Russian contacts with 
the CoE have been led by Russian elites and authorities, particularly the 
presidential apparatus and the Foreign Ministry (Checkel 1997). In the statist 
structure characterizing the Russian state, state officials serve as the primary 
means by which international norms and rules affect national policy outcome 
(ibid.). Additionally, since decision-making authority is centralized, domes-
tic human rights NGOs and other societal actors play a little role in empow-
ering CoE norms (ibid.; see also Cortell & Davis 1996). Thus, it is natural to 
look for answers to Russia’s partial compliance within state institutions. In 
my thesis I will focus on the Presidential Administration and the State 
Duma, and show that a pro-western Presidential Administration has contrib-
uted to a de facto abolishment, while a more nationalistic and anti-western 
State Duma has hindered Russia in fully complying with ECHR Protocol 
No. 6.  
Equally important, by bringing in domestic politics one may investigate 
how the international norm is embedded in the domestic arena and to what 
extent there is a “cultural match” between the international and domestic 
norm. By studying the domestic salience of the international norm we are 
able to reveal cultural practices that may “exert a causative influence on state 
policy”, a point stressed by Hopf above. In Russia’s dealing with the death 
penalty issue this is a central element. Throughout history, Russian legal 
practice has frequently applied the death penalty, and surveys conducted in 
the Russian Federation shows that a large majority of the public supports the 
death penalty. In the next chapter I will show how Russian adherence to 
European human rights norms has been part of the greater identity debate in 
Russia throughout history. 
 3. The Practice of European Human Rights in Russia’s Search 
for Identity 
 
I argue that Russia’s vacillating adherence to European human rights norms 
is part of the historical and ongoing identity debate in Russia. The tension in 
Russian national identity can be interpreted in the light of a struggle between 
Slavophiles and Westernises.6 Romantic nationalists gathered under the ban-
ner of “Slavophilism” stressing Russia’s native traditions and distinct cul-
ture, while those who were oriented towards Western values and Russia’s 
integration into European processes became known as Westernizers (Sakwa 
1996: 287; Neumann 1996: 28).7 Primarily, the dispute was about the value 
of individual freedom. Whereas the Westernizers saw human value deeply 
connected to his/her freedom, the Slavophiles believed that individual free-
dom was dangerous Western individualism, which had to be fought for the 
sake of the greater community (Nistad 2004: 86). Throughout history there 
are examples of Russian liberal reforms recognizing the rights of individuals 
and reforms of the judiciary in accordance with European models. However, 
it is also easy to depict a counter-tendency. In the next three sections I will 
illustrate how the tension between the two opposing views has materialized 
itself in Russia’s approach towards European human rights standards, put-
ting the most emphasis on post-Soviet Russia. 
3.1. Tsarist Russia 
 
Inspired by the French enlightenment, Catherine the Great initiated elections 
to a Legislative Commission in 1767 to consider the problems of individual 
and collective rights. About one century later, Aleksandr II ordered his offi-
cials to prepare a report guided by “those fundamental principles, the un-
doubted merit of which is at present recognized by the science and experi-
ence of Europe” (Hosking in Bowring 2001: 7). Three years later the Basic 
Principles were approved, which established one of the most important, in-
deed indispensable, preconditions for the rule of law; namely judicial inde-
pendence (Bowring 2001: 8). In 1899, on Russia’s initiative the first world 
conference on international law was held in Hague to discuss humanitarian 
issues (Chugrov in Forsythe 2000: 150). And under Prime Minister Peter 
Stolypin (1906–11), Russia moved closer to European standards, with 
Stolypin paying special attention to the problems of formal human rights. 
Aleksander Herzen (1812–70), a distinguished Westernizer, declared that 
history is a united movement for ever greater degree of individual freedom 
and that one should look to Western Europe for civil rights, secularization 
and liberal reforms (Nistad 2004: 97). However, the westernising reforms 
were highly controversial. Russia turned out to be one of the countries most 
hostile to the French revolution, which according to Chugrov may be ex-
                                                     
6  Zapadniki or Westernizers are also labeled “Europeanists” (Nistad 2004: 86). 
7  For a discussion on the difference between Russian conception of the “West” and 
“Europe” see for example Morozov (2004). 
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plained by the traditional Russian ideal society seen as “a religious commu-
nity that had no need to defend human rights because Love and Good took 
the place of rights” (Chugrov in Forsythe 2000: 150). Consequently, there 
was a mixture of legal and religious rules leading to a complex network of 
relations between the individuals and the state, which in turn emphasized 
collectivism at the expense of individuals (ibid.). As an example Russia’s 
strong mir was based on the idea of sacrificing individual rights for the sake 
of collectivist values (ibid.).8  
Moreover, MacFarlane claims that Western ideas concerning justice and 
rights had limited resonance in Russia’s imperial period (MacFarlane in Foot 
et al. 2003: 184). Neumann comments that: “Periods (…) when the Russian 
Westernizers have the upper hand in the debate have in the past been super-
seded by a turn away from the concurrent political life of Europe” (Neumann 
1996: 2). This is further elucidated by Bowring who states that “the adoption 
of Western European models was sees as threatening essential elements of 
Russian statehood, even of the Russian mission” (Bowring 2001: 7). This is 
in line with the Slavophiles who perceived Russia as being cultural superior 
to the West and feared that contact would weaken the state and pollute Rus-
sian culture (MacFarlane in Foot et al. 2003: 182). Moreover, Chugrov 
claims that the fear of excessive liberties facilitated the acceptance of a to-
talitarian form of government after 1917 to which I now will turn (Chugrov 
in Forsythe 2000: 151). 
3.2. The Soviet Union 
 
Paradoxically, the Western world was at the very centre of the Soviet sys-
tem. The West was Russia’s alter ego. The myth of a hostile and unjust 
Western civilization legitimised the Soviet Union. Western-European states 
attach great value to the rights of the individual citizen vis-à-vis his own 
government. In communist states, however, individual rights referred to the 
participation in society rather than protection from society (Baher 1996: 
100). Scholars have produced extensive research showing that there is a cor-
relation between regime type and the respect for human rights. Moreover, 
they conclude that democracy is the best form of government in order to pro-
tect human rights. Hence, there is a great gap between communist countries 
and democracies in regards to respect for human rights. In line with Marx-
ism-Leninism, the individual derives his rights from society, which is fun-
damentally different from the Western understanding where individuals pos-
sess certain natural rights that are given by birth. Since the government was 
the collective individual in the Soviet Union, there could be no antagonism 
between the government and the individual. Furthermore, as civil and politi-
cal rights have had precedence in the West, economic and social rights, such 
as the right to work and the right to health care, received most attention in 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, throughout the Soviet period there was a strong 
resistance towards the notion that human – and particularly civil and political 
- rights constituted matters of legitimate international concern. MacFarlane 
                                                     
8  Mir is the Russian word for the peasant community, which traditionally has held a strong 
position in the Russian society. 
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and Baher claim this was the reason why the Soviet Union abstained from 
voting during the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
the last half of the 1940s (MacFarlane in Foot et al. 2003: 193; Baher 1996: 
100).  
However, as Thomas shows in The Helsinki Effect, international human 
rights norms affected the behaviour, interests and identity of the Soviet Un-
ion by specifying which practices are (or are not) considered appropriate by 
international society (Thomas 2001: 281). The Helsinki process was enthusi-
astically endorsed by the Soviet Union as a way to secure acceptance of the 
post-Second World War territorial status quo in Europe and receiving recog-
nition and legitimation of its identity as the protector of “real existing social-
ism”. However, it ended up conferring vital legitimacy on the ideology of 
universal human rights and it played a special role in transforming Russia’s 
relationship to its international obligations. Moreover, it contributed to the 
emergence of Gorbachev and his “New Thinking” – and with it, the Russian 
debate about Europe resurfaced (ibid.).  
Gorbachev spoke of a “common European home” and Europe as a single, 
“cultural historical entity united by a common heritage” (Sakwa 1990: 237). 
He clearly signalled that some changes in the state’s position on Western 
relations were under way with new emphasis to the old theme of the call for 
extensive European state-based cooperation (Neumann 1996: 160–61). 1987 
was declared to be the “year of Europe” (ibid.), and Russia was seen as part 
of Europe and not apart from it: 
 
Some in the West are trying to “exclude” the Soviet Union from Europe. Now 
and then, as if inadvertently, they equate “Europe” with “Western Europe”. Such 
ploys, however, cannot change the geographic and historical realities. Russia’s 
trade, cultural and political links with other European nations and states have 
deep roots in history. We are Europeans. Old Russia was united with Europe by 
Christianity. […] The history of Russia is an organic part of the great European 
history (Gorbachev 1988: 190). 
 
Along with Gorbachev Vladimir Lukin spoke of “a return to Europe” (Neu-
mann 1996: 166). However, at the same time as Westernization was in the 
high tide in Russia, the slogan of “Eurasia” came up. A trend towards seeing 
Russia as a bridge between Europe and Asia evolved. Here one saw a “Eura-
sian” destiny for the Soviet Union as opposed to a Russian homecoming to 
Europe. The Eurasianist line of argument may be illustrated by the foreign 
policy specialist Elgiz Pozdnyakov, who stated that:  
 
Russia cannot return to Europe because it never belonged to it. Russia cannot 
join it because it is part of another type of civilization, another cultural and reli-
gious type (quoted in Neumann 1996: 177).  
 
Furthermore, he saw the coming of the “disease of ‘Europeanism’, of West-
ernism” during Peter the Great’s reign, and applied in an even more brutal 
form by Perestroika (Neumann 1996: 177).  
Thus, the Russian debate about Europe re-emerged during Perestroika. 
The Westernizers had to share centre stage with a revitalized Eurasian 
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movement, which drew on themes from Slavophilism. Eurasianists contested 
the European direction of Soviet foreign policy. As I argue, these different 
views on Russia’s place in the world, may explain post-Soviet Russia’s vac-
illating approach towards European human rights norms. 
3.3. Post-Soviet Russia 
 
Russia is not simply the legal successor state to the USSR but also a con-
tinuation of the former Soviet Union. Russia became automatically bound by 
the Soviet Union’s treaty obligations on human right matters by the UN 
Covenant on Civil and political rights, the Covenant of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights and the Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.9 Certain standards were reached during the Gorbachev era, 
but with more than 70 years under a communist regime the country faced 
great problems in order to meet international standards. Additionally, Russia 
had to come to terms with its revived national identity – and its relationship 
with Europe was an essential part of this. The debate between the Western-
ises and Slavophiles that resurfaced during Gorbachev’s reign has proven to 
be one of the most important debates in post-Soviet Russia. Opinion divided 
over whether Russia should rapidly integrate with Europe or stick to a 
“Eurasian” concept. The two tendencies, Atlanticism and Eurasianism, 
emerged in Russian foreign policy and went from being an internal quarrel 
to a quarrel inside the state structures about the state’s position (Neumann 
1996: 180).10 The European trajectory in foreign policy was repeatedly 
stressed by the Yeltsin administration; however it soon became challenged 
by the State Duma after the nationalists and the communists enjoyed great 
electoral successes in the Duma elections in 1993 and 1995 respectively. 
The first period of Russian foreign policy after the dissolution of the So-
viet Union is referred to as a “romantic phase” or “the euphoria period”, 
where the official philosophy saw the evolving Russian identity as congruent 
with the “normal” and “civilized” West (Arbatova 1998: 10; Sakwa 1996: 
278). The liberal-democratic view dominant in the first post-communist pe-
riod was firmly oriented towards integrating Russia into international or-
ganizations and the West. The “return to Europe” agenda found its most 
prominent home at the top of Foreign Ministry where Andrei Kozyrev was 
given the task of articulating the basic principles of Russian foreign policy in 
the early months of 1992. According to Donaldson and Nogee, he developed 
foreign policy ideas centred on the promotion of human rights, and universal 
values of global economic, environmental and nuclear security (Donaldson 
& Nogee 1998: 124). “The realization of human rights in our country,” 
Kozyrev declared “is inseparable from our policy to integrate Russia into the 
global family of democratic states” (Kozyrev 1992; Sakwa 1996: 291). Ac-
cordingly, Russia made a significant breakthrough in expanding its adher-
                                                     
9  See Buergenthal et al. (2002) and Steiner & Alston (2000) for details of the UN human 
rights system and description of the various Covenants and Protocols. 
10  Westernizers, liberals, democrats, Atlanticists or “international institutionalists” are put 
together in one group with an ideological foundation including elements of Gorbachev’s 
“New Thinking” and a commitment to the Western liberal values of democracy, human 
rights and free marked (see Kassianova 2001). 
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ence to international law (Chugrov in Foot et al. 2003: 171). In the 1993 
Constitution, international law was given priority over national legislation 
(see Articles 15 (4), 16, 18 & 42). The forming of the Commission on Hu-
man Rights by decree in November 1993 was an important measure to 
strengthen fundamental human rights and freedoms in Russia and to fortify 
international collaboration on human right issues within an institutional 
framework.11 A year later Yeltsin established an Ombudsman office.12 Ser-
gei Kovalyov, Russia’s first Human Rights Commissioner under President 
Yeltsin played a fundamental role in structuring human rights provisions in 
post-communist Russia despite the leftist majority in the State Duma that did 
its best to replace him (Chugrov in Foot et al. 2003: 154). The first annual 
human rights report was published by the Presidential Commission, which 
according to Gilligan is a “historical documents which reflect, for the first 
time, a serious attempt by the Russian government to face the objective real-
ity of human rights violations in Russia” (Gilligan 2004: 161). Moreover, in 
accordance with the liberal view, Kozyrev relied heavily on Russian partici-
pation in international institutions (ibid.). There were hints about a future 
Russian membership in EU as well as NATO, Russia applied for member-
ship in the Council of Europe, and association with international economic 
institutions such as GATT, WTO, IMF and OECD was pursued (Kjølberg 
1999).  
However, an opposition condemning Kozyrev’s alleged servility and 
“romantic” obsession with the West emerged in the spring and summer of 
1992, quickly focusing on the question of Russia’s identity (Donaldson & 
Nogee 1998: 125). Officials in a variety of government and academic institu-
tions expressed an “Eurasianist” viewpoint, threatening the liberal line in 
foreign policy and attacking the Foreign Ministry for “selling out” Russia to 
the West (Arbatova 1998: 11). According to Arbatova, the Russian leader-
ship started to succumb to primitive “non-idealistic” moods, primarily ap-
pealing to humiliated national pride (ibid.). As Sakwa assesses, the democ-
rats advocated a normative approach towards foreign policy, claiming that 
ethical and moral considerations had an important part to play in interna-
tional relations. The national-patriots on the other hand held a more tradi-
tional view in which foreign policy was determined by the power of states 
(Sakwa 1996: 291).  
Moreover, surveys demonstrated that there was no strong and united sup-
port among the Russian public for human rights (see for example White et 
al. 2005). Russians strongly advocate economic rights, but show only mod-
erate support for rights of the person, and only weak support for civil liber-
ties (Gerber & Mendelson 2002). The success of the communists and nation-
alists in 1993 and 1995 might be interpreted as public protest against West-
ern political, economic and social values (Lo 2003). Conceptions of human 
rights and other elements of civil society were seen by many Russians as 
benefiting only a small minority of the already privileged. As Lo notes, with 
the all-consuming material struggle in post-Soviet Russia, few will be en-
gaged in the question of violations of human rights as long as their rulers can 
                                                     
11  Decree No. 1798  
12  Decree No. 1587 
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assure them political stability, economic prosperity and national security 
(ibid.). 
In their “Strategy for Russia”, the Council for Foreign and Defence Pol-
icy (CFDP), stated that Russia and the West did not necessarily belong to the 
“same community” and the gap between the two would probably increase, 
hence the focus of Russian policy should shift away from the West (Sakwa 
1996: 279). Sergei Stankevitch, advisor to the president, assessed that “it 
will be most likely a strengthening of our positions in the East, straightening 
the manifest distortion permitted by the creators of the ‘common European 
home’ concept” (Stankevich 1992: 48). The Russian parliament became the 
main institutional platform for the Romantic nationalist position, claiming to 
represent the core of the state, the mainstay of the people and the heir to the 
long Russian tradition of opposing Westernisation.  
Yeltsin’s appointment of Yevgenii Primakov, who had been highly criti-
cal of the West, as Foreign Minister in January 1996 signalled an attempt to 
achieve consensus with the critics in the State Duma (see Neumann 1996: 
188; Sakwa 1996: 280). Primakov allied himself with the “pragmatic nation-
alists” and “Eurasian” viewpoints and quickly found support among broad 
segments of the Russian political elite for his foreign policy ideas 
(Donaldson & Nogee 1998: 131–32). The appointment of Primakov was a 
clear indicator that a new stage in Russian foreign policy had emerged (Ar-
batova 1998: 16). According to Arbatova, the combination of a confused 
national identity and disappointment with Western response to Russia’s de-
velopment, which at the end of the day proved to be superficial and mere 
rhetoric, lead to a new period labelled “pragmatism” (ibid.: 13).  
Primakov stressed that “Russia was and is a great power despite its hard-
ships, and its foreign policy should be tailored to this status” (Oldberg et al. 
1999: 16). The foreign policy should be “multidirectional”, meaning as 
noted by Oldberg “avoiding dependence on any power centre in the world 
(…) that is, to balance between them to Russia’s own benefit” (ibid.). More-
over, the highest priority in the “new” Russian foreign policy was the coun-
try’s relations with the CIS countries.  
What is clear from the above outline is that the ambivalent attitude to the 
West runs as a thread throughout Russian foreign policy in the 1990s, and 
this has been reflected in Russia’s human rights policy. Naturally, one of the 
many challenges Putin has faced during his presidency; the normative di-
mension – the sphere of identity, values and civilization – has proved the 
most intractable (Lo 2003). The conventional wisdom is that under Putin 
Russian foreign policy has become “Eurocentric”. However, it is also simul-
taneously devoting more attention to America, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle 
East and the CIS (ibid.).  
Putin’s engagement with the major European and Western structures – 
EU, CoE, NATO and WTO – needs to be understood on the background that 
the West was not only a civilizational home but that it also became a meta-
phor and as Lo argues “the means for Russia’s future progress as a devel-
oped nation” (Lo 2003: 102). To a large extent Putin’s task has been to con-
vince the West that Russia has emerged as a qualitatively different country. 
As Lo notes; “the challenge is (…) to convince a deeply sceptical external 
audience that it holds dear many of the same values and beliefs” (ibid.: 99). 
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It is against this backdrop, the different ideological trends and the internal 
strife over foreign policy, that I will investigate a more specific question of 
foreign and also internal policy: Russia’s membership in the CoE and its par-
tial compliance to the abolishment of the death penalty. 
 

 4. CoE’s Normative Foundation: Part of the Russian Identity? 
 
As assessed in the previous chapter, the human rights provisions of the Hel-
sinki Accords contributed to a gradual diffusion of human rights norms to 
the Soviet system. The unwavering support for human rights and detente 
among dissidents, such as Andrei Sakharov, together with Western transna-
tional partners influenced the Soviet in-system reformers (Herman in 
Katzenstein 1996). More and more often, the Soviet elite was exposed to the 
norms found in the Western liberal democracies (Hansen 2002b). As politi-
cal reforms were introduced into the party platform, an intellectual elite cap-
tured the agenda in the mid 1980s. As Herman notes the Soviet “New Think-
ing” was the product of “a profound reconceptualization of state interests” 
(Herman in Katzenstein 1996). Moreover, the decision to adhere to a new set 
of norms, Hansen affirms “led the Soviet Union to redefine its identity and 
international interests” (Hansen 2002a: 449; see also Herman in Katzenstein 
1996). This identity saw Russia as part of Europe, and took, as articulated by 
Gorbachev in the previous chapter, a clear westward orientation. 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the embryonic identity 
shaped by the “New Thinkers” was adopted by Russia. A fundamental part 
of Russia’s identity was to reintegrate with Europe and incorporate European 
values and standards, such as respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. In order to become a part of the European ideational community, 
Russia aspired for membership in the Council of Europe, Europe’s most de-
veloped human rights regime. However, as illustrated, the European orienta-
tion was soon contested by the “Eurasianist” view, which sought to preserve 
Russia’s status as a Eurasian great power distinct and independent from the 
West. They opposed efforts to integrate Russia into Western institutions. The 
West, they argued, would use such institutions to exploit Russia’s weakness. 
In this chapter I will first show how this “dual identity” became visible in the 
country’s relation to the CoE. Second, I will investigate the strength of the 
European abolitionist norm. 
4.1. Russia’s “Identity Crisis” Disclosed in its Rapprochement to CoE 
 
In line with the European orientation in foreign policy that characterized 
Russian foreign policy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Yel-
tsin government applied to join the CoE on 7 May 1992. By declaring that 
that one of its main tasks was to “act as a political anchor and human rights 
watchdog for Europe’s post-communist democracies”, and that it should be 
the “guardian of democratic security – founded on human rights, democracy 
and the rule of law” the CoE opened up for eastward enlargement.13 The 
Council’s decision to extend to the East was built on the same belief that was 
held among Russian Westernises, namely that the Eastern and Western coun-
tries shared a common European identity. Foreign Minister Kozyrev put it 
this way: 
                                                     
13  See CoE website at www.coe.int/T/e/Com/about_coe. 
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The task of our reintegration into the family of European civilization and devel-
oping a state based on the rule of law mandates that Russia join the Council of 
Europe, the most representative forum for European humanitarian and legal co-
operation. We have already initiated a formal request for admission to this or-
ganization (Kozyrev 1992: 290). 
 
As a member of the CoE, Russia would be part of a highly judicially devel-
oped human rights system; also when comparing with the OSCE and EU, the 
Council of Europe has clearly the longest and most significant record in this 
field. The Council’s human rights system began with the adoption of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), which entered into force in 1953, guaranteeing core civil and po-
litical rights. Another 14 protocols to the Convention have lengthened the 
list of guaranteed rights and strengthened the institutional framework to su-
pervise compliance by the Contracting Parties (Buergenthal et al. 2002: 
134). Furthermore, the Council proclaimed economic and social rights in the 
European Social Charter from 1961. Other important CoE human rights con-
ventions are the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted in 1987 and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities from 
1995.14  
Upon accession to the Council Russia would thus enter into numerous 
commitments aiming at the implementation of the Council’s conventions and 
protocols. In accordance with the expectations set by PACE in Opinion 193, 
Russia was obliged to ratify the ECHR and its protocols, the European Con-
vention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, and the European Social Charter just to mention a few. Alto-
gether, as a Contracting Party, Russia would be firmly embedded in the 
European normative structure. Moreover, the Council’s aim of “achieving 
greater unity between its members for safeguarding and realizing the ideals 
and principles which are their common heritage, and facilitating their eco-
nomic and social progress” (CoE, Chapter 1 of its Statue) is clearly in accor-
dance with the European orientation in Russian foreign policy. 
On 14 June 1992 Russia was granted guest status, a preliminary period 
before admission. The application procedure was, however, interrupted when 
Russian troops went into Chechnya in December 1994; this led PACE to 
suspend its considerations of Russia’s request for membership in light of the 
“indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force by Russia’s military, in 
particular against the civilian population, [which] constitutes a grave viola-
tion of the Council of Europe’s most elementary human rights principles”.15 
Nevertheless, formal consideration of Russia’s application resumed, as Rus-
sian authorities reassured the Council that the country would find a political 
solution in Chechnya.16  
                                                     
14  See Buergenthal et al. (2002) and Steiner & Alston (2000) for detailed description of the 
various protocols and conventions adopted. 
15  PACE Resolution 1055 (2 February 1995). 
16  PACE Resolution 1065 (27 September 1995). 
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In a high-level Russian Message, dated 18 January 1995, Russian authori-
ties affirmed that Russia would help to turn the standards of the Council 
“into norms generally accepted and generally applied throughout the conti-
nent”.17 Furthermore, the letter stated that after acceding to the ECHR “we 
will observe in full the obligations thereby accepted by us (…) and continue 
with even greater perseverance and effectiveness our efforts to improve leg-
islation and law enforcement practice in the Russian Federation in accor-
dance with the standards of the Council” (ibid.). The President of the Rus-
sian Federation, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the State Duma and the 
Chairman of the Federation Council all signed the high-level message. Ser-
gei Filatov, Head of the Presidential Administration, emphasized the signifi-
cance of the letter when stating that this was the only document in Russia 
signed by all these four people together and the best evidence of the impor-
tance Russia attached to membership. Upon entrance into the Council of 
Europe Vladimir Lukin, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee for 
Foreign Affairs, highlighted the effect the membership would have on ensur-
ing human rights and assisting Russia on its “path of democratizing the soci-
ety” (Lukin 1996). On 28 February 1996 Russia joined the Council of 
Europe, whereupon the Council concluded that “integration is better than 
isolation; cooperation is better than confrontation”.18 
However, members of the State Duma quickly disputed the legitimacy 
and acceptance of the CoE membership and the obligations that were put on 
Russia. First of all the State Duma’s support for a CoE membership was 
primarily seen as a way to protect the Russian minorities living in the Baltic 
States (Bowring 1997). Second, most members of the State Duma did not 
understand Russia’s obligations to be obligations at all, but simply recom-
mendations (ibid.: 633). When debating the Council’s demands in the State 
Duma, one member asked Lukin whether he did not have the feeling that 
Russia was being spoken to as if it was Honduras (ibid.). Moreover, Vladi-
mir Zhirinovskii made it clear that Russian norms were in many respects 
quite different from those of the Council of Europe (Bowring 1997).  
Kjølberg notes that the suspicion against the Council was strengthened by 
that fact that the majority of the State Duma members viewed the West in a 
very negative manner (Kjølberg 1999: 55). After the Duma election in 1993 
Zhirinovskii’s nationalistic LPDR and the Communist Party (CPRF) to-
gether with the liberal “Russia’s Choice” were the three largest parties. In 
the 1995 elections, LDPR and CPRF came out as the two largest parties. Not 
only does this demonstrate that the pro-Western orientation was deeply con-
tested in the public, but also that a large majority in the Duma was devoted 
to a anti-Western “crusade”, the revival of the Russian Empire, and the rein-
statement of the Soviet Union by military forces stressing Russia’s unique-
ness and superiority (Arbatov 1993; see also Richter in Wallander 1996 and 
Vendil in Oldberg et al. 1999). They rejected liberalism and its notion of 
universal values, human rights and the sovereignty of the individual (ibid.). 
It goes without saying that this clearly stands in stark opposition to a Russian 
                                                     
17  See Annex 3 to Doc. 7443, 2 January 1996, Report on Russia’s request for membership of 
the Council of Europe. 
18  Rapporteur Ernst Muehlemann, Russia’s Request for Membership of the Council of 
Europe, PACE, 1996 Sess., Doc. 7443. 
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reintegration “into the family of European civilization”. Moreover, the par-
liamentary opposition managed to have a significant impact on shifting the 
direction of Russian foreign policy (Crow 1993; Vendil in Oldberg et al. 
1999). Although the 1993 Constitution clearly states that the President de-
termines the basic guidelines of foreign policy, the State Duma retained the 
right to ratify international treaties. As a mark of disapproval of government 
policy, the State Duma postponed and delayed its ratification of treaties, as 
was the case with the ratification of START II in 1993. The nationalist and 
communist factions were against START II, and refused to place the treaty 
on the agenda (Light in Brown 2001). 
Above I have attempted to demonstrate how Russia’s post-Soviet “iden-
tity crisis” compounded the difficulty of formulating and implementing a 
consistent foreign policy in the country’s dealing with a CoE membership. 
The Duma on the one hand and the Foreign Ministry and the President on 
the other clearly represent different answers to the question as to whether 
Russia is part of Europe or whether it is an Asian or Eurasian power. In Rus-
sia’s case part of the elite valued the European identity of the Russian state; 
another part opposed it. This identity conflict has paved the way for diver-
gent interests, which in turn cause conflictual and inconsistent behaviour. 
As stated above, whether a state will comply with a norm or not will vary 
with the salience of the identity specified by the norm. Consequently, the 
pro-European actors in Russia would have an interest in complying with 
norms incumbent upon European states. In the opposite case, state actors do 
not have an interest in abiding by European norms and non-compliance is 
more likely. Of course, a prerequisite for norm-compliance among Russian 
pro-European actors is that the norm is empowered and enjoys great legiti-
macy in the CoE, i.e., that it is seen among CoE members as appropriate to 
comply with the prescribed norm (or as Wendt expressed it above: “Actors 
see themselves as a ‘we’ bound by certain norms”). Since a norm’s interna-
tional legitimacy will influence the impact a norm may have, it is thus neces-
sary to examine the norm further. This is also in accordance with Lutz and 
Sikkink’s constructivist research on the international normative context out-
lined above. Thus, in the next subchapter I will consider the strength of the 
death penalty abolitionist norm within the CoE and among its members. This 
serves two purposes; the first I just described, the second is that in order to 
evaluate the degree of “cultural match” between the international norm and 
the domestic norm one needs to first describe the prescriptive norm. 
4.2. The European Abolitionist Norm 
 
As seen above the Council of Europe has given real teeth to the protection of 
a wide range of rights in Europe. In the ECHR, “the right to life” is set up in 
Article 2, and in Article 2, paragraph 1, it is specified that everyone’s life 
shall be protected by law and that “no one shall be deprived of his life inten-
tionally, save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his convic-
tion of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law”. However, the 
status of capital punishment under European law was put forth in a later 
treaty. The primary instrument in this regard is the ECHR Protocol No. 6, 
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which prohibits capital punishment in peacetime. Article 1 reads: “The death 
penalty shall be abolished. No-one shall be condemned to such penalty or 
executed”. In December 1982 the Council’s Committee of Ministers for-
mally adopted Protocol No. 6, and the protocol was signed in 1983 and en-
tered into force in 1985.19  
The roots of the abolitionist movement in Western Europe go back to the 
period of enlightenment, when Cesare Beccaria in 1764 published On 
Crimes and Punishment. Here he declared that capital punishment was both 
inhumane and ineffective and an unacceptable weapon for a modern enlight-
ened state to employ (Hood 2002: 9). The death penalty, Beccaria states, is 
“a war of the nation against a citizen, a campaign waged on the ground that 
the nation has judged the destruction of his being to be useful or necessary” 
(Beccaria 1986: 48). In the 1780s the enlightened rulers of Tuscany and Aus-
tria took up Beccaria’s ideas, and for a few years capital punishment was 
abolished (Hood 2000). In Britain and several European states pressure be-
gan to mount for restricting the death penalty only for the gravest crimes 
(ibid.). Several Western European countries were frontrunners in abolishing 
the death penalty; in 1867 Portugal became the first European country to 
abolish the death penalty for all crimes committed in peacetime (Neumayer 
2004: 4). Soon the Netherlands, Romania, Italy, the Republic of San Marino 
and Switzerland followed (Hood 2002: 23). At the turn of the century, Nor-
way became the first Scandinavian country to become abolitionist, followed 
by Sweden, Iceland and Denmark. The Federal Republic of Germany abol-
ished capital punishment for all crimes in all circumstances in 1949, as was 
the case with Finland. 
However, it is not until after the Second World War that the abolitionist 
movement gathered momentum also in other regions of the world. From al-
most complete absence in 1945, several international and regional human 
rights regimes have been established where “the right to life” is set out. The 
major human rights treaties – the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) 
and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) all refer to 
the “the right to life”. The status of capital punishment under other regional 
human rights regimes is put forth in more recent treaties whereby states 
commit themselves to abolish capital punishment, either totally or with a 
limited exception for wartime crimes. Such treaties are the Second Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR (entered into force in 1991), the Protocol to the 
ACHR to Abolish Death Penalty (signed in 1990). 
However, Europe’s role and the Council of Europe’s significance must be 
emphasized. Roger Hood states: 
 
What marks the modern period from the past, when abolition was very much re-
garded as an “internal matter” of national penal policy, is the development from 
the late 1970s onwards of a European-led political movement to make abolition 
of the death penalty the touchstone of acceptable international standards of re-
spect for human rights (Hood 2002: 14). 
                                                     
19  Representatives of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland signed the treaty in April 
1983. 
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In the emergence of abolition as an international human rights norm, the 
Council of Europe has been a pioneer by establishing the first binding legal 
instrument to outlaw the death penalty in peacetime, and it has unquestiona-
bly played a fundamental role in Europe’s own progress towards the aboli-
tion of capital punishment. Protocol No. 6 was opened for signature seven 
years earlier than the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Proto-
col to the ACHR to Abolish Death Penalty. When the Parliamentary Assem-
bly made the abolishment of capital punishment a precondition for member-
ship in the Council, the European abolitionist movement was further 
strengthened.20 In Resolution 1044 the CoE states that any country wishing 
to become a member of the Council of Europe should agree to implement an 
immediate moratorium on executions and then sign and ratify protocol No. 6 
within a set period of years (see CoE Resolution 1044; Hood 2002: 16). By 
1990 14 of CoE’s members had ratified the Protocol, and by 2005 all except 
two countries have fully complied with the Council’s requirements by ratify-
ing the protocol and abolishing the death penalty de jure. Russia and 
Monaco have signed the Protocol, and abolished capital punishment de 
facto. Thus, the Council could declare Europe a death penalty free zone.21 
Further advancement in the European abolitionist movement was made when 
a recent addition to the Convention was put in place. Protocol No. 13, which 
came into force on 1 July 2003, abolishes capital punishment in all circum-
stances. So far, 30 out of the CoE’s 46 members have ratified Protocol No. 
13, and 13 countries have signed the Protocol. 
The outline above demonstrates that there is a consensus on the abolition-
ist norm among European states and that the norm has strong historical roots 
in European political culture. In the contemporary abolitionist movement the 
Council has been a pioneer, and all members (except Russia and Monaco) 
have fully abolished the death penalty. Thus, one can safely conclude with 
stating that the abolitionist norm has a strong standing in the European iden-
tity anchored in the CoE. In the next chapter I will build on the domestic 
politics argument, and investigate the Russian domestic level in order to find 
explanations for the country’s partial compliance with Protocol No. 6. 
 
 
 
                                                     
20  See PACE Resolution 1044 of 1994 on the Abolition of Capital Punishment. 
21  See PACE Doc. 8340 
 5. Russia and the Death Penalty 
 
On the basis of the strength of the abolitionist norm in the CoE and among 
its members, it should be obvious to the “Europeanist” Russian elite that in 
order to be a full member of the CoE and part of the European ideational 
community, it would be in their interest to abolish capital punishment. Yet, 
the country has only partially complied with CoE requirements specified in 
ECHR Protocol No. 6. Part of the explanation for this was disclosed in Rus-
sia’s dealing with CoE membership – the lack of a unified, coherent and 
widely accepted identity caused problems for a Russian membership in the 
CoE. In this chapter I will examine how this has been evident in Russia’s 
dealing with the issue of capital punishment. The other part of the explana-
tion, I argue, depends on the domestic salience of the prescribed norm. I will 
begin with elucidating the domestic salience of the abolitionist norm in Rus-
sia, and then move on to the colliding interests and conflictual behaviour 
between the President and the State Duma resulting in partial compliance 
with Protocol No.6. 
5.1. The Domestic Salience of the Abolitionist Norm in Russia 
 
By reintroducing the study of domestic politics, one may uncover cultural 
practice “sufficiently empowered through institutionalisation” that matter to 
state action in international relations. According to constructivist research 
conducted by for example Cortell, Davis and Checkel a “cultural match” 
between the international and domestic norm increases the likelihood of 
norm-compliance. Correspondingly, in the opposite case where there is a 
great value-gap between the international and domestic norm the likelihood 
of norm-violation increases. In the same manner as I examined the legiti-
macy of the abolitionist norm in the CoE, I will now study the domestic sali-
ence of the abolitionist norm. In this chapter I undertake three tasks. First, I 
will demonstrate what position death penalty has had in Russian legal prac-
tice. Second, I will examine how the judicial has dealt with the issue after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and how legal traditions have influenced 
the Russian stance. Third, I will look into public sentiments about the death 
penalty, as public opinion on capital punishment will be crucial for the do-
mestic salience of the norm. 
5.1.1. The Death Penalty’s Historical Trajectory in Russian Legal Practice 
 
During the consolidation of the Russia centralized state, the all-Russian 
Subedniks of 1497 and 1550 became important sources for legal norms con-
cerning capital punishment (Mikhlin 1999). The system of punishment and 
the process of its execution was directed towards the maximum terrorizing of 
criminals and the populace (ibid.). The next stage in the formation of the 
prescriptions concerning capital punishment was the Sobornoe Ulozhenie of 
1649, in which death penalty became one of the leading measures of pun-
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ishment (ibid.: 10). The penalty could be applied in more than 60 varieties of 
criminal acts. With the Military Articles of 1715, however, the severity of 
punishments and their executions reached new heights. Peter the Great’s 
Military Articles was the first systematization of criminal-law norms in Rus-
sia. More than a hundred types of criminal acts entailed death penalty, which 
was executed by “shooting, sword, gallows, wheel, quartering, and fire” 
(ibid.: 11–12). The death penalty was frequently applied and the number of 
persons punished was measured in thousands (ibid.). On the other hand, the 
liberal utilitarian and humanistic ideas spawned by the enlightenment in 
Europe also influenced the Russian empire. The earliest attempt to do away 
with capital punishment in Russia was made by Peter’s daughter Elisabeth. 
With Empress Elizabeth’s reign (1741–61) the use of the death penalty was 
suspended, although it remained in the statute books and the courts contin-
ued to hand out the sentence. 
According to Barry and Williams there were several other Russian rulers 
that instituted moratoriums or near moratoriums on executions for parts of 
their reign, while leaving the legal provisions permitting the death penalty 
untouched (Barry & Willliams 1997: 232). In a 1767 Nakaz (instruction), 
Catherine the Great (1762–1796), obviously influenced by Montesquieu and 
Beccaria, called for a limitation on the application of the death penalty. At 
the same time as fostering a more humanized penal practice, Catherine II 
nevertheless declared, “the death penalty is a certain medicine for a sick so-
ciety” (Mikhlin 1999: 13). At this stage, however, a number of Russian 
scholars began to call for a limitation on the death penalty. According to 
Mikhlin, a trend towards limitation of the death penalty became evident in 
the 1845 Ulozhenie on Criminal and Correctional Punishments, and 
strengthened in 1864 with the establishment of the Statute on Criminal Pro-
cedure. A procedure for appealing death sentences; for pardoning of con-
victed persons; and for execution of judgments was set up. As a rule, death 
penalties were no longer carried out in public and therefore excluding the 
purpose of terrifying the public. According to Piontkovskii’s data, 296 peo-
ple were executed in the period between 1866 and 1890, and 126 from 1890 
to 1900 (ibid.: 15). Ideas of humaneness in the penal system was further de-
veloped with the Criminal Ulozhenie of 1903, in which death sentences were 
retained for a rather narrow group of political crimes. Additionally, the pen-
alty could not be applied to persons under 21 or older than 70. The penalty 
was nevertheless still in use, which lead Vladimir Soloviev, a Russian phi-
losopher, to conclude in 1906 that; “[the] Death penalty is the last important 
position which the barbarian criminal law still upholds in contemporary life” 
(Kvashis 1999).  
Following the February revolution, the Provisional Government sus-
pended the use of the death penalty. However, with the October Revolution 
the application of death penalty grew rapidly. It was abolished on three occa-
sions, in 1917–18, in 1920–21, and for peacetime offences between 1947 
and 1950. However, each time it was rapidly reinstated based on the ration-
ale that the death penalty was necessary to defend the revolution against its 
class enemies. 
The RSFSR 1922 and 1926 Criminal Codes provided for the death pen-
alty in a separate Article, and with the 1960 Criminal Code the list of crimes 
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that entailed death sentence was expanded. The exact number of who were 
shot and who died in the camps with the repression and terror under Stalin 
has yet to be established, one speaks about 20–30 million or maybe more 
(Mikhlin 1999: 20). At the height of the purges in 1937–38, the number of 
executions was said to reach 1 million (Hood 2002: 30). Clearly, as Butler 
states “taking the century as a whole, few countries have used capital pun-
ishment so extensively, either judicially or extra-judicially” (quoted in Hood 
2002: 30). According to Pristavkin, from 1962 to 1990 21,000 people were 
executed (CoE 1999: 131). At the same time, however, the so-called “men of 
the sixties” with Sakharov in the lead followed by Sergei Kovalyev, began to 
raise their voices in protest against the acts of violence and state executions 
(ibid.). Following Gorbachev’s rise to power in 1985 and the commence-
ment of Glasnost there was a move towards reducing the number of capital 
crimes, at the same time as the taboo on the public debate on the death pen-
alty came to an end (Barry & Williams 1997: 234). In the USSR Principles 
of Criminal Legislation adopted in July 1991 there were five capital crimes 
(ibid.). 
Obviously, the country’s position on capital punishment has vacillated, 
but through most of its recorded history, Russia has been a country where 
the death penalty has been both legally and frequently used (Barry & Wil-
liams 1997: 231). Clearly, the states “right to execute” reached unprece-
dented heights under communism, and during Stalin’s reign the number of 
execution reached millions. Certainly this has created a strong anti-
abolitionist norm in Russia, which collides with an international abolitionist 
norm. However, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which should qualify 
as “world time” in Finnemore and Sikkinks term, opened up for new norms 
and ideas. The question is how the Russian judicial branch has dealt with 
capital punishment after the fall of communism. Would the ideas of hu-
maneness in the penal system that developed at the turn of the eighteenth 
century once again take hold and end capital punishment in the newborn 
Russian Federation? In the next section we will examine this subject further. 
5.1.2. The Russian Federation and the Death Penalty 
 
The Russian Federation continued to decrease the number of capital crimes, 
however, the 1993 Russian Constitution kept the death penalty as “as an ex-
ceptional measure for particular grave crimes against life”. Article 20 of the 
new Constitution reads: 
 
1) Everyone shall have the right to life. 
2) Capital punishment until its complete abolishment may be envisaged 
by a federal law as an exclusive penalty for especially grave crimes 
against life, and the accused shall be granted the right to have his case 
examined by a jury trial. 
 
Moreover, Russia’s 1996 Criminal Code, effective from 1 January 1997, 
kept the capital punishment. The number of capital crimes was reduced from 
28 to 5, imposing the death penalty on aggravated murder, attempted murder 
of a state or public figure, attempted murder of a person administering jus-
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tice of conducting a preliminary investigation, attempted murder of an em-
ployee of a law-enforcement agency, and genocide.22 Although the Criminal 
Code thus reduced the number of capital crimes, this had no practical impact 
since no prisoner sentenced to death in recent years had been sentenced on 
the basis of the 23 articles that no longer carry the death penalty. Moreover, 
according to the 1997 Criminal Code a death sentence may not be passed on 
women, on men who were over 65 and under 18 at the time of the offence or 
when the sentence is passed, nor on mentally ill persons (Mikhlin 1999: 33). 
In addition, the death penalty may be commuted to life imprisonment or 25 
years imprisonment through a clemency process.  
Due to an inconsistency concerning jury trials in the Russian Constitu-
tion, the Constitutional Court in a 1999 ruling practically made a complete 
ban on handing down death sentences. The Constitution states that an ac-
cused has the right to a jury trial; however, when jury trials do not exist 
throughout the country, the imposition of death penalties by non-jury courts 
was constitutionally deficient. The Court therefore concluded that capital 
punishment may not be imposed until jury trials are established throughout 
the whole territory of Russia (Feldbrugge 2002). A new Criminal Procedural 
Code went into force on 1 July 2002, paving the way for jury trials to be 
gradually introduced throughout the country. The last region to introduce 
jury trials will be the Chechen Republic (on 1 January 2007). Thus, when 
jury trials are introduced throughout the country, courts may start to hand 
down death sentences again. 
Evidently, there is little support for an abolitionist norm in Russian legal 
traditions, both historically and currently. The death penalty is institutional-
ized in the legal system, both in the Constitution and the Criminal Code, al-
though the number of capital punishments has decreased. Until the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision, courts continued to hand down death sentences, thus 
by 1999 600 prisoners were on the death row. And even if the Constitutional 
Court’s decision prohibited courts to hand down death sentences, this was 
due to a constitutional deficiency and not because the practice of capital pun-
ishment was seen as wrong. Consequently, the domestic salience of an aboli-
tionist norm in the Russian judiciary is evidently low. How about public sen-
timents? 
5.1.2.1. Public Sentiments 
 
Various polls carried out shows that there is a high decree of popular support 
for capital punishment among the Russian populace, ranging from 65–
80%.23 Furthermore, among the ten most important and vital questions that 
perturb society, surveys show that the re-introduction of death penalty lies in 
fifth place (CoE 2004). The Russian Orthodox Church seems to be some-
what ambivalent towards the issue, first calling for the resumption of capital 
punishment, and then taking a more neutral position (Feldbrugge 2002: 8). In 
the Basic Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church the Church states 
that: 
 
                                                     
22  Article 105, 277, 295, 317 and 357 of the 1996 Russian Criminal Code. 
23  RIA Novosti, 6 July 2005. See also www.vor.ru for Russian public opinion. 
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Keeping in mind that mercy toward a fallen man is always more preferable than 
revenge, the Church welcomes these steps [the abolishment of the death penalty] 
by state authorities. At the same time she believes that the decision to abolish or 
not to apply death penalty should be made by society freely, considering the rate 
of crime and the state of law-enforcement and judiciary, and even more so, the 
need to protect the life of its well-intentioned members.24 
 
The latest public debate about the death penalty came in the midst of a “sud-
den surge” in pro-death penalty sentiment that seemed to pick up momentum 
during 2000 and 2001 (Feldbrugge 2002: 7). Following the murder of a 17-
year-old girl, her father, a professor at Moscow State University, published a 
letter in which he argued for the re-instalment of the death penalty, conclud-
ing that the moratorium was implemented “in order to satisfy the West’s po-
litical demands and despite the people’s will” (ibid.). The newspaper publi-
cation titled “To the people and the president” was signed by about a hun-
dred well-known Russian figures (CoE 2004: 200). One of the most influen-
tial new voices in the pro-death penalty camp is Nobel Prize winner Alek-
sandr Solzhenitsyn. He expressed the view that the moratorium on execu-
tions “was dictated by people in Strasbourg (CoE) who don’t understand 
conditions in Russia (…) Europe has not experienced the ordeals that Russia 
has gone through. It simply doesn’t know them” (quoted in Feldbrugge 
2002: 6). 
As Kvashis states, the capital punishment is not only an instrument of 
criminal policy, but a social and cultural phenomenon (Kvashis 1999). He 
claims that the attitude to capital punishment is formed on the basis of a 
complicated interaction of historical, political, cultural and legal factors. It is 
worth citing Kvashis further when trying to comprehend why Russians so 
strongly support the punishment. He assesses that:  
 
The majority of the population tormented by the unsettled state of their lives, 
tired of waiting for noticeable reforms and being far from understanding the real 
democratic values highly believe that it is impossible to combat delinquency 
without cruelty. This conception of justice has been cultivated for the period of 
many years, but in recent years it became even stronger because of unprece-
dented growth of delinquency (Kvashis 1999). 
 
Commenting on the particular Russian background and how this has influ-
enced the value of human life, a retentionist has put it this way: 
 
Liberals in our opinion, completely ignore Russian sociocultural “background.” 
Among us there have always existed an extremely significant number of people 
who are not deterred from committing murder wither by prison or in particular 
by labor colonies (…) And the succession of wars and cruel repression [that we 
have experienced] has lowered catastrophically the value of the human personal-
ity, of life itself (…) And this applies even more so to present Russia (quoted in 
Barry & Williams 1997: 252). 
 
                                                     
24  See www.mospat.ru/text/e_conception/id/4050.html. 
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Clearly, the death penalty enjoys strong support not only in the legal system, 
but also among the Russian population. All together one can reasonably con-
clude by saying that there is a lack of domestic salience for a European abo-
litionist norm in Russia. Following the theoretical argument, the likelihood 
of norm-violation thus increases, as there is a great value-gap between the 
international and the domestic norm. This, I argue, will partially explain 
Russia’s partial compliance. I will now turn to my other argument; how pol-
icy preferences and underlying identities of domestic actors have been chan-
nelled through different political intuitions and led to conflicting behaviour. 
5.2. Russia’s Partial Compliance: the President against the Duma 
 
At the time when Russia applied to join the CoE, a majority of the CoE’s 
members had abolished the death penalty. The Council’s work towards a 
European death penalty free zone was further strengthened in 1994 when all 
countries wishing to become a member should agree to implement an imme-
diate moratorium on executions and then sign and ratify Protocol No. 6 
within three years. Hence, when Russia became a member the country made 
a commitment to fully abolish the death penalty by 1999. However, the 
country has still not fully abolished the death penalty. As already noted, with 
the 1993 Constitution the president has been entrusted to draw up the basic 
guidelines for Russian foreign policy; however, the State Duma has retained 
the right to ratify international treaties. Aware of the different perceptions of 
the State Duma and the President of Russian identity, particularly following 
by the elections in 1993 and 1995, I will outline how these differences influ-
enced Russia’s dealing with the obligations laid out in Protocol No. 6 after 
Russia became the 39th member of the Council of Europe.  
In accordance with the theoretical argument, the “dual identity” will lead 
to colliding interests and in turn vacillating behaviour. Hence, in the next 
section I will describe how the interests of the State Duma and the President 
have collided in the country’s dealing with Protocol No. 6, and how this has 
lead to vacillating behaviour resulting in a partial compliance with Protocol 
No. 6. 
5.2.1. Yeltsin’s Moratorium on the Death Penalty 
 
The presidential decree “On the gradual curtailing of the application of the 
death penalty in connection with the admission of Russia to the Council of 
Europe” in May 1996 was the first official act by the Yeltsin administration 
aimed at coming to terms with the Council’s demands.25 The words “grad-
ual” and “curtailing” are clearly in strong contradiction to the Council’s firm 
commitments. According to Ritter, the decree was passed with the under-
standing that the provisions were recommendations from the Council and not 
actually binding obligations (Ritter 2000: 139). As Barry and Williams note, 
the government in its efforts to bring parliament along needed to give the 
impression that it had not yielded too much to CoE demands (Barry & Wil-
liams 1997). However, in complete contradiction to the Council’s require-
                                                     
25  Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 742. 
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ments, Russia continued to execute prisoners after it had become a member. 
According to the Chairman of the Presidential Clemency Commission, 53 
persons were executed in the first half of 1996. The PACE condemned Rus-
sia for “a flagrant violation of her commitments and obligations”, and 
warned the Russian authorities that it would take “all necessary steps to en-
sure compliance with commitments entered into”.26 One such step would in 
practice mean to consider the non-ratification of the credentials of the Rus-
sian parliamentary delegation at its next session. Hence, Russia ran the risk 
of expulsion if it did not meet the commitments to place a moratorium on 
executions and abolish the death penalty. In a resolution by PACE in June 
1996, the Council demanded that Russia “honour its commitments and carry 
out no executions”.27 Hence, on 4 August 1996, the Russian executive 
branch moved to meet the Council of Europe’s demands and President Yel-
tsin put a de facto presidential moratorium on capital punishment.  
In March 1997, draft legislation was introduced in the State Duma for a 
moratorium on executions. The Russian deputies Valeriy Borshchev and 
Yulii Rybakov introduced the first draft on a bill on the moratorium on the 
death penalty, but on 14 March 1997 the State Duma rejected it with 176 
votes against 76 with 6 abstentions.28 Thus, Russia was left with an ad hoc 
arrangement, where the president reviewed cases where a convicted person 
made a plea for clemency, at the same time as the courts were handing out 
new death sentences. Reflecting upon this particularly unpleasant aspect of 
his presidency, Yeltsin states in his Midnight Diaries that: 
 
The green files also contained requests for pardons for those convicted of capital 
crimes. I dreaded those files the most. How to decide a question of life or death? 
How, with one stroke of a pen, to determine the fate that only God knows? These 
were terrible documents, chilling to the soul (Yeltsin 2000: 119). 
 
President Yeltsin attempted to show Russia’s good-faith efforts to fulfil its 
obligations by ordering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to sign Protocol No. 
6 on behalf of the Russian Federation. Thus, an important step was taken in 
April 1997 when Russia signed the protocol. However, as the State Duma’s 
ratification of the treaty was needed for a full abolishment, this did not have 
any real effects.  
In 1999 Russia should, according to the commitments undertaken by ac-
cession to the CoE, fully abolish the death penalty. In April 1999, Yeltsin 
granted clemency to the 600 persons sentenced to death, commuting their 
sentences to life imprisonment or 25 years imprisonment. And the Constitu-
tional Court’s decision the same year prolonged the moratorium at least till 
2007. 
5.2.2. Putin Supports the Abolishment of the Death Penalty 
 
Putin avoided discussing capital punishment for over a year after his election 
as president in March 2000. However, increasingly vocal support for ending 
                                                     
26  See PACE Resolution No. 1111 and No. 1997. 
27  PACE Resolution No. 1097. 
28  See www.prison.org/english/mcprwork.htm. 
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the moratorium on executions may have made him take a stand. On an inter-
national conference on judicial and legal reform organized by the World 
Bank in July 2001, he spoke for the first time against the death penalty: 
 
If the hypothesis that we suffer most from the evil existing within ourselves is 
true, then we can say that by making punishment harsher – and the death penalty 
is in fact not punishment, but rather vengeance on the part of the state – then, by 
increasing the severity of punishments, the state is not eliminating cruelty but 
merely reproducing it again and again. The state ought not to assume a right that 
can belong to the Almighty alone – taking life from a human being. As a result, I 
can firmly state that I am against restoration of the death penalty in Russia 
(quoted in Feldbrugge 2002: 8; see also CoE 2004: 203). 
 
Putin’s support for abolition of the death penalty did not sway parliament. 
On the contrary, the State Duma made its position very clear in an appeal to 
the President on 15 February 2002, asking him to cancel Russia’s morato-
rium. This came as a response to a drafted bill on the abolishment of the 
death penalty presented by the liberal Union of Rightist Forces party (SPS). 
The SPS members called upon the State Duma to ratify Protocol No. 6 and 
to cancel the death penalty provision in the Criminal Code.29 Instead 266 
deputies against 85 voted in favour of asking the President to reintroduce the 
death penalty.30 Putin replied that lifting the moratorium on the death pen-
alty would be “foolish”, not succeeding, though, to persuade the State 
Duma.31 Furthermore, Russia’s Human Rights Ombudsman, Oleg Mironov, 
stated that to lift the moratorium “could significantly affect Russia’s interna-
tional prestige”, and “Russia would find herself outside the civilized Euro-
pean society if the Duma were to defy international standards” (quoted in 
CoE 2004: 203). In his report to the CoE in 2002, Mironov stated that with 
Russia’s implementation of its obligations “the issue of choice by Russia of 
its place in the world and in Europe is clearly in the foreground”. He contin-
ued: 
 
One possibility is that the country could come back to old totalitarian and au-
thoritarian models, methods, ideals and values under the slogan of “Russian 
originality” and specific peculiarities (…) Or else, Russia could choose the way 
towards integration into Europe, towards adaptation to democratic ideals and 
values with human rights and freedoms in its very center. The continuation of ac-
tive participation in the Council of Europe, the complete non-revocable imple-
mentation of the international obligations undertaken represents to a certain ex-
tent the sign, which one of the two directions is chosen (Mironov 2002). 
 
Adding to the strong protest against the moratorium is “the war against ter-
rorism”. When establishing counter-terrorism laws, one of the propositions 
has been to apply the death penalty to those convicted of terrorism. In con-
nection with the State Duma’s discussion of anti-terrorism amendments to 
                                                     
29  See www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5591–15.cfm. 
30  See www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/2002/02–02–19.rferl.html. 
31  See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1870916.stm and http://issues.strana.ru/ top-
ics/52/01/07/11/6485.html. 
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the Criminal Code in February 2004, Dmitrii Rogozin, Deputy Speaker of 
the State Duma and leader of Rodina gave his support for the death penalty 
in cases involving trafficking and terrorism. Furthermore, explicitly dismiss-
ing the standards and principles of the Council of Europe he stated: “We 
have to determine our human rights standards by ourselves, and use them to 
restore order in the country”.32 Standing firm in the retentionist camp Dep-
uty Prosecutor General Vladimir Kolesnikov advocated the cancellation of 
Russia’s death penalty moratorium for terrorists, as did Deputy Speaker of 
the State Duma Lyubov Sliska from the pro-president United Russia party. 
“I believe that such crimes as terrorism should entail the death sentence”, she 
told in a news conference in Moscow in April 2004.33 Also the Deputy Head 
of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Vyacheslav Ushakov, addressing the 
State Duma deputies advocated the idea of lifting the moratorium on the use 
of the death penalty for terrorists.34 Several deputies agreed with Ushakov, 
adding that as soon as “law enforcers introduce such a motion, the Duma 
would without hesitation lift the moratorium”.35  
Nevertheless, the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, controlling two-thirds 
of the seats in the State Duma, ruled out a proposal to lift the moratorium on 
capital punishment in the case of convicted terrorists in February 2004.36 
The Chairman of the Federation Council Committee for International Af-
fairs, Mikhail Margelov, stated that a reinstatement of the death penalty 
would be a step back, and “the revocation of the death penalty moratorium in 
Russia might lead to harsh reaction from the West. Only US Republicans 
would probable understand such a decision of Russia”.37 At the same time, 
bearing in mind Putin’s strong support in the State Duma, one must wonder 
why Putin has not pushed through the ratification of the protocol in the 
Duma – especially since he has come out so strong against the death penalty 
himself. Partially, I would argue that this is exactly due to the weak domestic 
salience of the abolitionist norm. Nevertheless, due to the European strength 
of the abolitionist norm Putin should feel obliged by the CoE to fully abolish 
the penalty. The evidence seems to support that Russia’s current position on 
capital punishment is a rational equilibrium upheld by the President. How 
may this be explained theoretically? To what extent does this support the 
constructivist argument? This is an issue that I will return to in my analysis 
and try to elucidate. In any case, Russia’s partial compliance is still a fact as 
it has been since the country became a CoE member in 1996.  
In the next section I will illustrate how the CoE through social practice 
has worked in order to influence Russia to comply with its commitments, 
and change the country’s behaviour regarding the practice of the death pen-
alty. In accordance with the theory, identities give each state an understand-
ing of its interests, attitudes and probable action. Through social practice 
states obtain an understanding of what for example a “European identity” 
entails. Despite Russia’s failure to fully abolish capital punishment, the 
country has succeeded in changing its action by de facto abolishing capital 
                                                     
32  See www.fidh.org/article.php3?id_article=604. 
33  See www.mosnews.com/news/2004/04/13/deathpenalty.shtml. 
34  See www.hrvc.net/news2004/11–2–04.html. 
35  See www.hrvc.net/news2004/11–2–04.html. 
36  See http://web.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/09/21/001.html. 
37  See http://english.pravda.ru/printed.html?news_id=14229. 
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punishment; a change that occurred after the country became a member of 
the CoE. Even though the abolitionist norm is not internalised, the prescrip-
tions embodied in the norm has become a focus of domestic debate, which 
implies the norm’s empowerment (Checkel 1999). Moreover, due to the 
moratorium, changes have been made in national institutions and state pol-
icy, indicators stressed by Cortell and Davis above as implying that a norm 
is gaining domestic legitimacy. 
5.3. CoE and the Russian Dialogue: Social Practice 
 
Several mechanisms may be at work in changing behaviour. Through per-
suasion one may change what people value and what they think is right or 
good (Finnemore 2003). Moreover international institutions bring people 
into frequent contact, which tends to create a common pool of shared experi-
ence, and over time, a shared outlook. Social influence, Finnemore notes, 
“involves the use of rewards and punishments such as back patting and 
shaming to change behaviour”, however, without necessarily changing pri-
vate acceptance of new beliefs (ibid.: 158). Furthermore, through social 
practice the international norm is “transferred” from the international level to 
the particular state(s); states become aware of that the prescribed norm is an 
essential part of a particular identity. As noted above, constructivism be-
lieves that the interests and identities of states are partially created through 
interaction and can change through interaction. Moreover, states might form 
collective identities and interests through interaction. In this section I will 
review the social practice that has taken place between the CoE and Russia 
as regards the abolishment of the death penalty. 
The Council has several of “tools” at its disposal to ensure that member 
states comply with the EHCR’s standards. The Convention provides for a 
process through which and offender state can be brought before the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. Another component of the human rights su-
pervisory mechanisms includes the work of the Parliamentary Assembly 
(PACE). The Assembly’s committees and their rapporteurs may issue criti-
cal reports or positive recommendations and a state could risk expulsion if it 
does not comply with its commitments. 
The Council’s work with Russia on the death penalty issue has been – 
and still is – a great test on its ability to ensure that member states comply 
with the its requirements and the ECHR standards. One basic strategy the 
CoE has promoted is compliance through conditionality. Conditionality, 
Checkel notes, is “a mutual arrangement by which a government takes, or 
promises to take, certain policy actions” (Checkel 2000: 2). As noted, in 
1994 the CoE made the abolishment of the death penalty a prerequisite for 
membership, implying that new members were conditioned to promise full 
abolishment of the death penalty within three years after membership was 
granted. Much of the Russian–CoE dialogue on the death penalty issue is 
based on the conditionality strategy, the CoE constantly reminding Russia of 
the promises it undertook when becoming a member. After membership, the 
dialogue is characterized by persuasion and discussions. The Council of 
Europe’s work for a European death penalty-free zone has been promoted 
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through discussions with supporters of death penalty in order to counter their 
arguments and to give strength to the abolitionist views. The Council has 
employed several of its mechanisms to make Russia comply. One is the ex-
change of information and knowledge, such as a clemency conference held 
in Novgorod in October 2000. One of the aims of this conference was to de-
cide which steps had to be taken in order to fully abolish capital punishment. 
Other measures are economical assistance. In 1999 the CoE and the EU es-
tablished a joint awareness campaign at a cost of 670,000 Euros over two 
years to provide information for the general public, legal experts and parlia-
mentarians (Manners 2002: 250). “Shaming” and threats about sanctions and 
exclusion are more “hard power tools” that the Council employs. Despite 
attempts to circumvent, stall or water down its obligations, the Council has 
paid close attention to Russia’s record.  
Assessing the last ten years, the PACE has adopted no less than five reso-
lutions and four recommendations on the abolition of the death penalty, reit-
erating its total opposition to the death penalty, which it considers a grave 
violation of human rights. Since 1996 the Council has issued a series of 
warnings, threats, ultimatums and resolutions. As already pointed out, in 
1996 the Council issued Resolution No. 1097 whereby it demanded Russian 
compliance on abolition of the death penalty. Likewise, in Resolution No. 
1111 from 1997, the Council warned the Russian delegation that it might be 
excluded from the Parliamentary Assembly. In a report from 1998 on Rus-
sia’s honouring of obligations and commitments, the PACE rapporteurs rec-
ognize Russia’s progress towards the rule of law and democracy.38 However, 
the Council’s Monitoring Committee underlined the country’s shortcomings 
in several areas and calls for particular attention to its complete abolition of 
the death penalty. In May 1999, the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights raised its concern that prisoners remain on the death row in 
Russia.39 In its report it states, “Russia must realize that the Assembly totally 
rules out any possibility of releasing them from their commitments to abolish 
the death penalty.” Furthermore, the report affirmed “the Assembly has con-
sistently warned member states which are reluctant to honour their commit-
ments to bring an end to all executions and abolish death penalty.” At the 
same time however, it noted that with the moratorium on executions Russia 
has been keeping its commitments and that “though the situation is still very 
confused, there is certainly a trend towards abolition in the medium term” 
(my emphasize). On Yeltsin’s decision to commute all death sentences to 
life imprisonment in 1999 Renate Wohlwend, rapporteur on the death pen-
alty to PACE, commented: “I hope that this decision reflects a commitment 
to abandoning the death penalty once and for all. I would point out that this 
announcement comes only just ahead of the deadline giver for Russia’s un-
dertaking to abolish the death penalty”.40  
Reacting to the most recent death penalty debate in Russia, the PACE is-
sued a declaration in which it again reminded Russia of the possibility to 
exclude the country from the organization. The debate led the Secretary 
General to publish an article in Rossiskaya gazeta, underlining Russia’s 
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39  PACE Doc. 8340. 
40  See http://press.coe.int/cp/99/81a(99).htm. 
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commitments as a member of “the European family”, followed by a letter 
from the President of the Parliamentary Assembly stating: “The conse-
quences of not fully meeting its obligations are not theoretical. They are im-
mediate and they are painful for all.”41 In an official visit to Russian in Feb-
ruary 2005. Terry Davis, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
stated: “It would be incorrect to say that Russia has fulfilled everything (…) 
When Russia joined the Council of Europe, it made a series of promises, but 
not all of them have been fulfilled. Therefore monitoring still makes 
sense”.42 The latest report from PACE, published on 3 June 2005, strongly 
urges the Russian authorities “to take advantage of the absolute majority 
they enjoy in the parliament and to ratify Protocol No. 6 without any further 
delay by December 2005” (my emphasis).43 It remains to be seen whether 
Russia this time will move towards the full abolishment of the death penalty 
within the new deadline set by the CoE. 
 
 
                                                     
41  See http://assembly.coe.int/communication/presidentspeeches/olddocs. 
42  See www.moldova.org/print/eng/1/524. 
43  PACE Doc. 10568. 
 6. Analysis 
In my analysis I undertake four tasks. First, I briefly recapitulate how my 
theoretical argument explains Russia’s partial compliance to Protocol No. 6. 
Recognizing that the debate between the rational paradigm and the construc-
tivist paradigm currently is, or is about to become, the most significant in the 
discipline, I bring in rational approaches as alternative explanations to Rus-
sia’s partial compliance. Moreover, given my constructivist orientation, the 
logical alternative explanations to norm (non-)- compliance is more rational 
explanations. Hence, my second task is to elucidate how the rational para-
digm within international relations accounts for norms and norm-compliance 
and how it stands in opposition to constructivism. Here I will also pay atten-
tion to the different directions that exist within rationalism, and how these 
explain norms and norm-compliance in international relations. Third, as a 
logical next step I will apply rational insights to Russia’s partial compliance 
with ECHR Protocol No. 6, and ask whether we actually may understand the 
country’s conduct in the death penalty issue as instrumental calculations by 
rational and unitary actors without taking into consideration a state’s identity 
and non-material forces. Here I will draw on literature that explains Russian 
ideational behaviour within the rational paradigm. Finally, I will discuss the 
explanatory power of the constructivist approach compared to the rational 
paradigm when it comes to Russia’s partial compliance. I argue that there are 
several weaknesses with rational explanations to norm compliance, but that 
one cannot completely dismiss the rational approach as part of the explana-
tion. I conclude with suggesting that instrumental calculations may explain 
Russia’s position on the death penalty after the Duma election in 2003, how-
ever, understood within a constructivist framework characterized by identity 
formation and a value-debate. Consequently, this implies further research 
aimed at theoretical bridge-building. 
6.1. Russia’s de facto Abolishment of the Death Penalty: a Constructivist 
Cut 
 
In my thesis I argue that Russia’s partial compliance with Protocol No. 6 is a 
consequence of the lack of a unified and coherent identity. The dispute be-
tween Russian state actors as to whether Russia is part of Europe or not is 
reflected in its adherence to European human rights standards. As I have il-
lustrated, this is not only visible in Russia’s dealing with the death penalty 
issue, but has been a subject matter during the tsarist time and the Soviet 
Union period as well. When the Soviet Union came to an end, the pro-
western foreign policy quickly became disputed within state institutions such 
as the State Duma. The Russian “identity crisis” is easily detected in the 
country’s rapprochement to the CoE and Protocol No. 6. The CoE worked as 
a so-called norm entrepreneur, and recalling Lutz and Sikkink’s work, due to 
an increased regional consensus, the abolishment of the death penalty be-
came part of a European identity. Since interests and the consequent behav-
iour is a product of identity, it was in the interest of those actors who wanted 
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to ensure the European identity of the newborn Russian state to embrace the 
European abolitionist norm. This, I claim, led to a de facto abolishment of 
the death penalty, a change carried out under Yeltsin’s watch. The social 
practice that I have identified gave these actors an understanding of how 
Russia should behave as a European state. As Wendt states, the transition 
from “them” to “us” was made possible, and by implementing a moratorium 
on the death penalty, Russia opened up for a collective identity formation 
with the European ideational community. The failure to fully comply with 
Protocol No. 6 within three years is explained by the State Duma rejecting 
the idea of Russia as part of Europe – it was simply not in the conservative 
majority’s interests to behave according to the standards set forth by the 
CoE. Additionally, the strength of the anti-abolitionist norm in Russia has 
made it difficult to legitimate a strong European abolitionist norm, and in 
this way domestic cultural practices exert a causative influence on state pol-
icy. Thus, only a partial compliance with Protocol No. 6 was reached within 
the three-year time limit set by the CoE.  
By emphasizing domestic politics and relaxing the unitary-actor assump-
tion, I am able to disclose how policy-making in Russia results from ongoing 
battles among actors that adhere to a European identity and actors that op-
pose this orientation. I argue that norm (non-) compliance is a result from the 
interplay between identity, interests and the consequent behaviour, a theo-
retical argument that I derive from the constructivist camp. Why states fol-
low norms (or not) and what motivate them to act in accordance to or violate 
relate to the state’s identity, I claim (see Fearon & Wendt in Carlsnaes et al. 
2002: 61). 
Acknowledging the dispute within IR-theory regarding the role of norms 
and norm-compliance, I believe it is worth taking a closer look at the alterna-
tive explanations within the IR-field, rationalism being the most logical one 
seeing norm-compliance rather as careful calculations by instrumental ac-
tors. According to March and Olsen, the difference between the two para-
digms is related to which logic drives norm-conforming behaviour – the 
“logic of appropriateness” versus the “logic of consequences” (March & Ol-
sen 1998). When dealing with the relation between the premises of action 
and society, scholars within the constructivist position see political actors as 
acting in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed 
and held together by socio-cultural bonds, intersubjective understanding and 
senses of belonging (ibid.). The rational position on the other hand under-
stands the international system as being made up of interacting autonomous, 
egoistic, self-interested actors and preferences as given (ibid.). Conse-
quently, governments comply with norms after an instrumental calculation 
of what action would best serve their own self-interest. The question thus 
arises: may we understand Russia’s partial compliance to ECHR Protocol 
No. 6 simply as instrumental calculations by a rational and unitary actor op-
erating in an anarchic international environment? Is it really necessary to 
examine a specific norm’s international and domestic legitimacy and the 
state’s identity in order to explain Russia’s ideational behaviour? Is it not so 
that “states adopt to the community beliefs and practices, not because it re-
gards them as true and right, but because adoption is necessary to further its 
political goals?” (Schimmelfennig 2000: 117). In order to address these 
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questions I will first elucidate how the rational paradigm within international 
relations accounts for norms and norm-compliance and how it stands in op-
position to constructivism. Here I will also pay attention to the different di-
rections that exist within rationalism, and how they explain norms and norm-
compliance in international relations. 
6.2. Alternative Explanations to Norm-compliance: Rationalism and In-
strumental Calculation 
 
Realism has traditionally held a privileged place on the theoretical menu of 
international relations. One may distinguish between Morgenthau’s classical 
realism, Waltz’s structural or defensive realism, and Mearsheimer’s offen-
sive realism or neo-realism (Mearsheimer 2001). Largely, what separate the 
three are the reasons they give for why states compete for power and their 
assumptions of how much power states want. The bedrock assumption unit-
ing all three is the understanding of states as rational, unitary actors and the 
principal actors in world politics. Moreover, the international system 
strongly shapes the behaviour of states, and structural factors such as anar-
chy and the distribution of power are what matters most for explaining inter-
national politics (ibid.). According to Mearsheimer, survival is the most im-
portant goal of states and the anarchic international system encourages states 
to behave aggressively in order to survive (ibid.).  
Premised on rational assumptions, neoliberalism (or neoinstitutionalism) 
agrees with neorealism that states are unitary and rational actors that seek 
utility maximization and that the international system is anarchic. However, 
neoliberals like Keohane and Nye tend to argue that states are interdependent 
and rely on international organizations and agreements for creating order out 
of an anarchic chaos, thus the anarchical character of the international sys-
tem is modified by regimes and institutions (Jordan 2003). The difference 
between realism and neoliberalism is further underlined by Cornett and 
Caporoso, who see that the “decisive difference between neo-realism and 
neo-institutionalism has to do with the relative significance each attributes to 
international institutions” (Cornett & Caporoso in Matlary 2002: 84).  
In general, realism in its various guises has paid very little attention to the 
role of international norms and norm compliance in international relations. 
As mentioned, when governments do employ support for human rights, it is 
to justify the pursuit of geopolitical interests, and norms have only a limited 
influence as an intervening variable between power distribution and interna-
tional outcomes (Moravscik 2000). When states consider non-security goals 
such as compliance to international norms, they will always be subjugated to 
security in the hierarchy of state goals (survival is the primary interest). Ac-
cording to realist theories of international relations, governments accept in-
ternational obligations “because they are compelled to do so by great pow-
ers, which externalize their ideology” (ibid.: 221).  
Neoliberals, who have a relative optimistic view of cooperation, assign 
more significant influence to norms than realists do. Hence, within the ra-
tional paradigm neoliberal institutionalism has been the dominant approach 
to the study of international norms. Keohane and his functional theory of 
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regimes focus on how international organizations and agreements are used 
by governments to reduce uncertainty and produce predictability in the in-
ternational system (Keohane 1984: 97). Despite how international regimes 
and rules threaten the “myopic self-interest” of governments, states comply 
because international regimes facilitate negotiations that lead to mutually 
beneficial agreements among governments (ibid.: 107).  
A central point in the debate between realism and constructivism, which 
has also been touched upon earlier in the thesis, is how the rational paradigm 
in contrast with constructivism treats identity and preferences as given. In 
turn this has led to a negligence of domestic politics within rational ap-
proaches. However, Moravscik has challenged realism and neo-liberal insti-
tutionalism on their own analytical turf by disputing the assumption that 
state preferences are given, and has taken up the challenge of bringing in 
domestic politics in the study of norms and norm-compliance. Moravscik 
proposes a third, “republican” view, which explains the acceptance of norms 
not in realist terms (where the most powerful democracies coerce or entice 
weaker countries to accept norms) but as a result of instrumental calculations 
about domestic politics (Moravscik 1997). While realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism view the international system as more state-centric, liberal 
international relations theory places emphasis on the domestic sources of 
state preferences as the determinant of outcomes in international politics 
(ibid.). Accordingly, the theory seeks to generalize about the social condi-
tions under which the behaviour of self-interested actors converges toward 
cooperation or conflict (ibid.: 517). 
6.3. Russian Conduct in the CoE: Rational Action in a Normative Envi-
ronment? 
 
Having outlined the rational paradigm and how the different directions ex-
plain norms and norm-compliance in international relations, I turn to the is-
sue raised above; namely whether Russian ideational behaviour may simply 
be explained within the rational paradigm without turning to constructivism. 
By drawing on work that sees Russia’s ideational behaviour within the ra-
tional paradigm, I will investigate Russian partial compliance through a ra-
tional understanding. 
Schimmelfennig argues that international socialization in Europe is best 
explained as a process of rational action in a normatively institutionalized 
international environment (Schimmelfennig 2000). Accordingly, selfish po-
litical actors conform to European norms in order to reap the benefits of in-
ternational legitimacy. Particularly two benefits come with international le-
gitimacy; first, the recognition as a legitimate state enhances the state’s secu-
rity and autonomy; and second, as a legitimate state it is entitled to join in-
ternational organizations that gives it a say in international decisions and 
access to internationally distributed resources such as development aid. 
Implementing rational reasoning on the Russian partial compliance one 
may of course find arguments that support Schimmelfennig’s line of argu-
ment. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the territorial boundaries 
of the Russian Federation became radically different not only from those of 
Trude Johnson 52 
the USSR but also from those of any prior independent Russian state. Rus-
sia’s newly independent neighbours, the former Soviet republics – relations 
with which were now matters of foreign rather than domestic policy – obvi-
ously posed challenges to the new state. Moreover, Russia’s new neighbours 
encompassed many areas of instability, and the resulting military and politi-
cal concerns for the Russian government were amplified by the fact that 25 
million ethnic Russians resided in these new states (Donaldson & Nogee 
1998: 109). Furthermore, Russia’s economy was in dire straits. And commu-
nism, despite of all its failures, had developed a system that in many ways 
managed to sustain a certain standard of living among the Russian populace 
that the new Russian state was unable to sustain. Thus, it is not difficult to 
understand that it was central to the Russian state to be recognized as a le-
gitimate state and thereby enhance the state’s security and stability. Further-
more, by joining for instance the CoE, Russia was given a say in interna-
tional decisions, which in turn would protect Russian national interests. This 
is reflected in the State Duma’s main argument for becoming a CoE mem-
ber; namely that membership would permit Russia better to defend the inter-
ests of ethnic Russians living abroad, particularly in the Baltic republics 
(Bowring 1997). Moreover, as a member of international organizations, Rus-
sia would be eligible to much needed internationally distributed aid. Conse-
quently, a moratorium on the death penalty was a low cost compared to the 
benefits of being a part of the “good European company”. According to the 
rational logic, the moratorium was simply window-dressing and a way to 
further the state’s political goals. 
According to Schimmelfennig, actors calculate whether the benefits of in-
ternational legitimacy are worth the costs of conformity (Schimmelfennig 
2000). By manipulating the standards of legitimacy states may lessen the 
domestic impact of norms by adapting to the standards at a superficial level 
without really acting in accordance to the norms or by interpreting the norms 
in ways more compatible with their interests. In accordance with the rational 
line of reasoning this would explain why Russia has only partially complied 
with Protocol No. 6. Because there is so strong support for the death penalty 
among the Russian public, the parliamentarians fear that norm compliance 
would challenge their political power and positions, and have therefore re-
fused to ratify Protocol No. 6 (Beach 2005, Schimmelfennig 2000). 
Moreover, following Schimmelfennig’s argument, by only implementing 
a moratorium on the death penalty and not de jure abolishing capital pun-
ishment, Russia has also managed to manipulate the international standard. 
In this way, Russia has lessened the domestic impact of the abolitionist norm 
by adapting to the standards at a superficial level. In the rational sense this 
balance serves to make both the Russian public and the CoE somewhat 
happy and content with Russia’s position. During Putin’s presidency, this 
balance has been upheld. 
By weighing costs and benefits of norm compliance, Schimmelfennig ar-
gues that successful norm compliance may be explained without taking into 
account non-egoistic actor utilities and the identification of state actors with 
the international society (Schimmelfennig 2000). Russia, Schimmelfennig 
claims, is a most interesting case since state actors have come to power with 
a liberal-democratic programme in a society with weak Western orientations. 
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Under these conditions, Schimmelfennig concludes “the government will try 
to increase their utility by presenting themselves as committed reformers to 
the Western organizations in order to earn external material gratifications 
and, at the same time, take care not to lose domestic support as a result of 
radical reforms” (ibid.: 134). 
Drawing on rational arguments, but by stressing domestic politics to a 
greater extent, Moravscik claims that newly established democracies that 
have become CoE members employ ECHR norms as a way to “lock in” the 
domestic political status quo against non-democratic opponents (Moravscik 
1997). He elucidates this by noting that in the face of future political uncer-
tainty international institutional commitments are self-interested means of 
“locking in” particular preferred domestic policies at home and abroad. Mo-
ravscik notes that “states pursue particular interpretations and combinations 
of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by powerful domestic groups 
enfranchised by representative institutions and preferences” (ibid.: 519). A 
sitting government weighs two crosscutting considerations: restricting gov-
ernment discretion/judgment (sovereignty cost) and reducing domestic po-
litical uncertainty (ibid.: 227). Following Moravscik’s argument, due to the 
position of the different groupings such as the ultranationalists and the die-
hard communists, Yeltsin and his supporters sought membership in interna-
tional organizations and complied with international commitments purely as 
a way to secure their own position on the domestic arena. Hence, Yeltsin’s 
moratorium on the death penalty was nothing more than merely instrumental 
calculations as to how one could best reduce domestic political uncertainty 
and increase international acceptance and support. Following the rational 
reasoning, Yeltsin was faced with weighing up the cost of going against the 
Russian public, who strongly favoured the death penalty, or against the CoE, 
which stands for a robust European abolitionist norm. Yeltsin chose the first, 
as he as a rational actor calculated that a de facto abolishment of the death 
penalty had a greater benefit in terms of increasing his international reputa-
tion. According to Moravscik’s rational logic then, what first seems to be a 
conversion to moral altruism is in fact an instrumental calculation on how 
best to “lock in”. 
In the same manner, Jordan claims that Russian compliance to CoE 
norms is best explained by instrumental calculations (Jordan 2003). She 
states that “countries such as the Russian Federation appears to be motivated 
more to guard their existing interests in areas their governments see as na-
tional security concerns than to meet obligations and take part in social 
learning” (ibid.: 688). Accordingly, the domestic debate about the death pen-
alty and Russia’s partial compliance with the CoE abolitionist norm serve to 
illustrate that Russia’s ideational behaviour is best explained by instrumental 
calculations. Since one of Russia’s main arguments for retaining the death 
penalty is that it would deter crime and counter terrorism; Russia pays more 
attention to its own national security than to international obligations. In this 
way, Russia has failed to internalise human rights out of a sense of obliga-
tion and an acknowledgement of their legitimacy and in stead protected its 
status quo national interests in defiance of its pledge to observe human rights 
norms – a behaviour that confirms a rational understanding of Russia’s idea-
tional behaviour (ibid.: 664). 
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6.4. Russia’s Partial Compliance: a Rational Equilibrium within a Con-
structivist Framework 
 
Above I began with proposing the rational paradigm as an alternative expla-
nation to state compliance with international norms and followed up by elu-
cidating some of rationalism’s basic assumptions in order to show how the 
approach diverges with the constructivist orientation. I illustrated how re-
search within the rational paradigm uses its assumptions to explain state ad-
herence to international norms. In order to make use of this work in my case, 
I paid particular attention to research that incorporates Russia in its explana-
tions. By drawing on this research I ended with showing how rational ap-
proaches would explain Russia’s partial compliance to Protocol No. 6. A 
logical next step is to discuss the explanatory power of the constructivist ap-
proach compared to the rational one.  
First, however, I will illustrate some of the more general weaknesses of 
the rational approach when it comes to explaining the role of norms and 
norm compliance. One weakness relates to one of rationalism’s basic as-
sumptions, another to the lack of focus on domestic politics. I argue that 
constructivism and its focus on identity and the interaction between identity, 
interests and behaviour can to explain most of Russia’s partial compliance. 
However, towards the end of this section, I question whether it is right to 
fully dismiss the rational approach as part of the explanation for Russia’s 
current position on the death penalty. 
As illustrated above, there are different approaches within the rational 
paradigm that deals with norms and norm compliance. According to realism, 
security is priority number one in the hierarchy of state goals, as states must 
ensure survival in the anarchic international system. I question the clear dis-
tinction between compliance to international norms and security that the re-
alist theory implies. If one operates with a so-called extended security con-
cept (one that goes beyond territorial conquest), violation of human rights 
might easily be a threat to state security. This is also a subject that Brooks 
raises in his work when he argues for a more flexible understanding of the 
hierarchy of state goals and a recognition that states do not only rely on mili-
tary to secure their objectives (Brooks 1997). Moreover, because distribution 
of power is the most important determinant of actor behaviour in realism, 
changes in international relations, including norm change, come about only 
when this distribution of power changes (Florini 1996). Hence, realism fails 
to capture the more everyday changes that take place among states in an in-
ternational environment. 
What follows from realist assumptions is that states are treated like black 
boxes or billiard balls, and therefore domestic considerations are omitted 
from the explanation. Mearsheimer himself confirms his theory’s weakness 
when admitting that under these circumstances the theory will not perform as 
well (Mearsheimer 2001: 11). But in a defensive manner, he argues, “there is 
a price to pay for simplifying reality” (ibid.). Clearly, this is true, but by tak-
ing state preferences and interests as given, preference formation and how 
ideas may constitute power relations is neglected (Jordan 2003). Obviously, 
this is one of the main problems with power-oriented conceptions of interna-
tional authority. The two mainstream theories do not address the issues of 
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preference formation, or when and under what conditions norms shape the 
interests of states. As a consequence, states’ interests and preferences are 
taken for granted.  
As noted, Moravscik has taken this criticism seriously and disputed the 
assumptions that state preferences are given and that the state acts as a uni-
tary actor. By drawing on rational reasoning he explains norm compliance as 
resulting from instrumental calculations about domestic politics, not. The 
impact of varying domestic political institutions – in particular the scope and 
bias of political representation – on foreign policy is stressed. Moreover, 
states are self-interested and rational in their pursuit of (varying) underlying 
national interests, which reflect in turn variation in the nature of domestic 
social pressures and representative institutions.  
Despite Moravscik’s efforts to stress domestic politics, neither his view 
nor rationalism in general is able to explain more fundamental, internal 
changes in an actor’s goals (Martin & Simmons 1998: 743). Ruggie elabo-
rates this by noting, “the problem is that power may predict the form of the 
international order, but not its content (Ruggie in Florini 1996: 365). Real-
ism in its various disguises and neoliberalism (or neoinstitutionalism) fail to 
explain where particular interests come from by taking them for granted. 
Moravscik opens up the “black box” and manages to take hold of the com-
plexity that characterizes domestic politics and shape a state’s behaviour in 
the international system. However, also he assumes interests a priori (al-
though on a different level) by not attempting to explain how domestic ac-
tors obtain the particular preferences that they do.  
I will argue that precisely because constructivism pays attention to non-
material forces such as norms and their impact on policy outcomes and treats 
identity as an empirical issue to be theorized within a historical context, one 
may comprehend the particular interests of actors and their consequential 
behavior. As Ruggie puts it, “a core constructivist research concern is what 
happens before the neo-utilitarian model purportedly kicks in” (Ruggie 
1998: 867). Moreover, as Kahler notes, “choices are simply highly con-
strained by social and cultural determinants and that socially constituted 
identities are an ontological issue prior to behavioral modelling along ra-
tional choice lines” (Kahler 1998: 936). 
In the rational approach one is not able to capture a century long debate 
in Russia about Russian identity – whether Russia is understood as part of 
Europe, a Eurasian country or “something of its own” – and how this has 
affected domestic actors’ preferences and behaviour. This question of a 
state’s identity is an issue that the constructivist camp takes seriously. Of 
course, domestic actors’ interests shape policy but these interests are not 
exogenized and given, but influenced by who the actors identify themselves 
with. Again one may turn to Hopf, who states, “identities strongly imply a 
particular set of interests with respect to choices of action in particular do-
mains” (Hopf 1998: 175). As shown, a European trajectory in foreign policy 
was repeatedly underlined by the Yeltsin administration, and particularly by 
Kozyrev, stressing Russia’s “return to Europe”. As demonstrated, however, 
this trajectory was contested for instance by the communists and the LDPR, 
which have a very different perception of what the Russian identity is. By 
focusing on domestic factors, one may examine how this “identity crisis” is 
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channelled through state institutions, in this case, the Presidential Admini-
stration and the State Duma. As demonstrated, the Duma repeatedly rejected 
the abolishment of the death penalty during Yeltsin’s presidency, whereas 
Yeltsin himself strongly favoured an abolishment. Clearly, Yeltsin combined 
words with deeds by issuing a presidential moratorium on the death penalty. 
This fits with my argument that the more state actors value the European 
identity of their state, the more they will seek to comply with norms incum-
bent upon European states. In the opposite case, as was the case with the 
State Duma (particularly after the elections in 1993 and 1995), actors will be 
more reluctant to follow European norms; hence norm violation is more 
likely. 
This is only part of the constructivist story on Russia’s partial compli-
ance, however. By highlighting norms and their social forces one also sees 
how they actually may have an influence on policy outcome. I argue that the 
“cultural match” between the international norm and the domestic norm is 
decisive for state compliance with international norms. Consequently, Rus-
sia’s partial compliance with ECHR Protocol No. 6 is also explained by the 
strong domestic counter-norm colliding with the European abolitionist norm. 
If the Russian public did not feel so strongly against the abolition of the 
death penalty and if the death penalty was not so firmly embedded in the 
Russian legal practice, it would have been easier to picture a ratification of 
Protocol No. 6 in spite of the State Duma’s resistance against a westward 
turn in foreign policy.  
I believe the argument that state compliance with international norms is 
dependent upon the domestic salience of the norm is further strengthened by 
Russia’s current position on the issue. As seen, President Putin has come out 
as a strong supporter of the abolition of the death penalty, stating that, “the 
state ought not to assume a right that can belong to the Almighty alone – 
taking life from a human being”. At the same time, however, parliamentari-
ans are still resisting a ratification of Protocol No. 6, something that con-
firms the presence of a strong domestic counter-norm to the international 
abolitionist norm. Consequently, I argue that contrary to what Schimmelfen-
nig states, the implementation of norms does require personal internalisation 
at the level of policy-makers and contrary to the work of Risse, Ropp and 
Sikkink I pay attention to individual belief systems (Schimmelfennig 2000; 
Risse et al. 1999). 
For personal internalisation to have an effect on state policy it is of 
course crucial that the individual is in a position to influence policy. When 
we talk about the President of the Russian Federation, however, it would be 
foolish not to examine his personal view. By pointing to official statements 
as I do, one may of course claim that it is all talk and no action. However, as 
Fearon and Wendt state, “unless we are prepared to dismiss all talk as cheap, 
then the kinds of discourse that actors use should count for something” 
(Fearon & Wendt in Carlsnaes et al. 2002: 70). They continue by noting that 
“on the behavioral side, in turn, we might expect to see observable differ-
ences at both the individual and aggregate levels in rates of norm compli-
ance” (ibid.). 
Nevertheless, despite the evident weaknesses of the rational paradigm 
when it comes to explaining norms and norm compliance, I am not ready to 
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completely dismiss the rational approach as a potential part of the explana-
tion for Russian partial compliance. As noted, in February 2004 the pro-
Kremlin United Russia party, having two-thirds of the seats in the State 
Duma, ruled out a proposal to lift the moratorium on capital punishment. 
The State Duma has not, however, taken any measures aimed at ratifying 
Protocol No. 6. Neither has President Putin pushed through a ratification of 
Protocol No. 6. One may ask whether there is some kind of a tacit under-
standing between the two branches of power; if the Presidential Administra-
tion does not attempt to push through ratification, the State Duma will not 
challenge the moratorium and the de facto abolishment. Even though the 
CoE continues to raise the question of Russia’s only partial compliance, it 
has not used the “ultimate” tools (such as expulsion) to force Russia to fully 
comply with Protocol No. 6. It is thus reasonable to argue that the President 
calculates that the CoE will not initiate such measures now, as it has not 
done so during the six years Russia has violated its commitment to fully 
abolish the death penalty. Hence, the President keeps the State Duma, the 
Russian public and the CoE all partially content. Obviously, such an expla-
nation fits neatly into the rational paradigm of instrumental calculations. 
It will be interesting to see what, if anything will happen as a conse-
quence of the CoE’s last country report on Russia, where it gives Russia un-
til December this year (2005) to fully abolish the death penalty. The CoE 
urges the President and Russian authorities “to take advantage of the abso-
lute majority they enjoy in the parliament” in order to finally ratify Protocol 
No. 6. As witnessed, so far the President’s position on the death penalty is-
sue has been decisive for the outcome. Perhaps Putin will fully abolish the 
death penalty now as he, knowing how much the CoE values the abolitionist 
norm, wants to appear as a “good pupil” in the run-up to the Russian Chair-
manship in the CoE (from May next year)?  
Where does this leave us in the theoretical debate? I began this section by 
asking whether it is right to fully dismiss the rational approach as part of the 
explanation for Russia’s current position on the death penalty. From the out-
line above it is reasonable to conclude that the two approaches put together 
increase the explanatory power of how and why states comply with interna-
tional norms. Although I have kept a clear constructivist orientation in my 
thesis, it seems reasonable to argue that Russia’s partial compliance to the 
European norm of abolishing the death penalty entails instrumental calcula-
tions as well. Hence, my findings end up contributing to the more general 
debate over bridge building between rational choice and social constructiv-
ism. To bridge the rationalist–constructivist divide requires us to recognize 
that norms can have both constraining and constitutive effects, and that norm 
compliance may be explained by a normative as well as an instrumental 
logic of action. As Fearon and Wendt state, “the theoretical challenge is 
therefore one of identifying the conditions under which each hypothesis 
holds, rather than showing that one is always right or wrong. In the larger 
scheme of things, both hypotheses are probably true” (Fearon & Wendt in 
Carlsnaes et al. 2002: 61). Drawing on the same line of reasoning, March 
and Olsen assert that “political actors are constituted both by their interests, 
by which they evaluate their expected consequences, and by the rules em-
bedded in their identities and political institutions” (March & Olsen 1998: 
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952). Below I will briefly illustrate how one may pursue a theoretical bridge-
building programme.  
6.4.1. A Theoretical Dialogue: Possibilities and Practices 
Caporaso and Checkel identify four distinct modes of theoretical conversa-
tion: competitive testing; additative theory based on complementary domains 
of application; sequencing of theories; and incorporation (Caporoso et al. 
2003: 19). Competitive testing attempts to confirm some theories and refute 
others. Thus, when aiming at theory synthesis, it is not very applicable. The 
complementary domains of application approach strives for a minimal syn-
thesis, where the aim is to specify scope conditions of each theory, what its 
domain is, how it relates to others, and finally to bring together each domain 
of application explain some larger picture. Sequencing approaches suggests 
that variables from both approaches work together over time to fully explain 
a given domain, and that each approach depends on the other temporally to 
explain a given outcome. And finally, the incorporation approach implies 
that one theory can be logically derived from the other. Empirically, the pri-
mary theory needs to show that it explains everything that the derivative the-
ory explains.  
In a slightly different manner, but with the same understanding that ra-
tionalism and constructivism possess a degree of commensurability, March 
and Olsen illuminate the four major interpretations of the relationship be-
tween the “logic of consequences” and the “logic of appropriateness” 
(March & Olson 1998). The first interpretation suggests that when prefer-
ences and consequences are precise and identities or their rules are ambigu-
ous, a logic of consequences tends to be more important. Conversely, when 
identities and their implications are clear but the implications of preferences 
or anticipated consequences are not, a logic of appropriateness tends to be 
more important (ibid.: 952). The second interpretation holds that the two 
logics have different domains of application. The third sees the relation be-
tween consequential action and rule-based action as a developmental one. 
Accordingly, March and Olsen argue that “actors enter into new relation-
ships for instrumental reasons but develop identities and rules as a result of 
their experience, thus shifting towards rule-based action, which they then 
pass on to subsequent actors” (ibid.: 953). In a sense, this may be related to 
the sequencing model outlined above. Finally, the fourth interpretation sees 
either logic as a special case of the other. It is similar to the incorporation 
model in the sense that one logic is derived from the other.  
Recapitulating my findings, perhaps they may prove to fit into the theo-
retical conversation labelled sequencing. Constructivism would then explain 
Russian actors’ interests and identities, while rationalism would best explain 
the current position of partial compliance as an outcome between actors with 
fixed preferences. As Tierney and Weaver state, “since the predicted out-
come in the rationalist model is dependent upon the preferences of the rele-
vant actors, then in any application of the rationalist model, a good empirical 
fit between the predictions and results will be driven by the accuracy of the 
value assigned to the actor’s preferences” (Tierney & Weaver 2004: 17–18). 
 7. My Findings and the Road Ahead 
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize four points that highlights my find-
ings and their implications for further research on international human rights 
norms within the field of political science and IR theory in general and on 
Russia’s behaviour in particular.  
The first refers to the study of human rights within the field of political 
science in general. Several academic fields such as philosophy, law and re-
ligion address human rights, but topics evolving around the domestic imple-
mentation of international human rights norms should be in particular focus 
among political scientists (see Bexell 2003). Askelöf notes that within politi-
cal science the study of human rights is all about how values laid down in 
international conventions are implemented in a country’s national policy and 
how those values are put into practice (Asklöf in Bexell 2003: 223). My 
study of Russia’s partial compliance serves as a case that aims to contribute 
to the implementation literature that ought to be in the focus of political sci-
entists. 
The second point I would like to stress is how my theoretical argument 
suggests a way to implement a constructivist understanding on empirical 
material. As the constructivist project has evolved in the field over the past 
twenty years or so, empirical studies have documented the impact of princi-
pled norms on patters of international outcomes and state policies, including 
the growing significance of human rights. The constructivist project led by 
John Ruggie, Friedrich Kratochwil, Alexander Wendt, Emanuel Adler and 
others has carried the study of norms and state (non-) compliance to norms 
further. Moreover, constructivists have in various ways focused on norms, 
identity, interests and behaviour. In my study I suggest that the interplay be-
tween these concepts may be one possible way to understand Russia’s partial 
compliance to ECHR Protocol No. 6. I argue that interests are the product of 
identity, and whether state actors comply with norms depend on the salience 
of the identity specified by the norm. As a state has multiple identities, the 
interests and consequent action will be in a competing and conflictual rela-
tionship to each other when these identities collide. Hence, when identities 
overlap and their norms conflict, norm compliance is challenged. The con-
structivist approach allows us to treat identity as an empirical question to be 
theorized within a historical context, and instead of taking preferences as 
given and exogenous we can examine the reasons for actors having specific 
interests. This in turn, I argue, requires us to look into domestic politics and 
look into the “black box”, a research programme strongly advocated by a 
new wave of scholars within the constructivist camp. In this way one may 
not only problematize a state’s identity but also uncover features of domestic 
society and culture that should matter to state identity and state action in in-
ternational relations. By examining the cultural match between the interna-
tional norm and the domestic norm it is possible to reveal cultural practices 
that may exert a causative influence on state policy. Thus, in line with the 
constructivist school, by focusing on social and ideational forces and not 
only material ones, one may better comprehend “what makes the world hang 
together”. 
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A third point I would like to pay attention to is the usefulness of applying 
my constructivist theoretical argument on Russia. First of all, my study im-
plicitly suggests that when examining Russian ideational behaviour, one may 
come a long way by employing constructivist insights. Gorbachev and his 
reformers reinvoked a century old debate between Westernises and Slavo-
philes; is Russia part of Europe or is it an Asian power or perhaps something 
different with a unique mission? After the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
Russia’s post-Soviet “identity crisis” is an issue that runs as a thread 
throughout Russian domestic politics and provoked one of the most impor-
tant debates in post-Soviet Russia. In my study, I take Russia’s “dual iden-
tity” seriously by employing constructivist insights. In this way it is possible 
to investigate how the disagreement inside the state structures about the 
state’s identity influences Russian ideational behaviour. I explore how a 
more pro-western presidential administration has collided with a more anti-
western State Duma, particularly during Yeltsin’s reign, and how this in turn 
has affected the actual policy outcome of partial compliance. Furthermore, 
by examining the domestic salience of an international norm, I aim to show 
how the degree of cultural match may contribute to a state’s level of compli-
ance with an international norm. I have looked into Russian legal practices 
and public sentiments as a way to evaluate the domestic legitimacy of the 
international norm. Through this work I have been able to confirm a strong 
anti-abolitionist norm in Russia, which collides with an international aboli-
tionist norm. 
The last point I wish to highlight is what implications my study has for IR 
theory. Questions like how do internationally codified human right norms 
make a difference; does the use of international law affect how states or do-
mestic actors behave; and which are the most significant actors are all of in-
creasing interest to IR theorists and policy-makers alike (see for instance 
Raustiala & Slaughter 2002, Schmitz & Sikkink 2002). At the core of this is 
of course the questions of why human rights violations occur in the first 
place or why human rights norms are complied with? Realist, liberal and 
constructivist theories give different answers to these questions. Given the 
Russian “identity crisis” that surfaced after the dissolution of the Soviet Un-
ion, I saw it fit to choose a constructivist orientation for my thesis. However, 
after working through my material, I would argue that rational assumptions 
should not be completely dismissed from the explanation. Rather I suggest 
that Russia’s partial compliance with Protocol No. 6 may be understood as a 
rational equilibrium within a constructivist framework. By upholding the 
current position of partial compliance Putin manages to keep the State 
Duma, the Russian public and the CoE all partially content, an approach that 
fits into the rational paradigm of instrumental calculations. In this way my 
findings contribute to the research programme that endeavours to build 
bridges between rational choice and constructivism. Moreover, I make the 
proposition that my case may be an example of temporal sequencing, where 
the constructivist approach explains the underlying interests and identities of 
those Russian state actors that aim to abolish the death penalty and those that 
aim to retain it. Rationalism would, however, best explain the current Rus-
sian position of partial compliance. Hopefully my findings may contribute to 
new ways of understanding Russian compliance with international human 
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rights norms or lack of such by using constructivist insights and theoretical 
bridge-building. 
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